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INTRODUCTION 
Congress created the Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
Network (“the OPTN”), a quasi-governmental agency, to allocate the 
nation’s supply of deceased-donor organs. But, this agency is a shell.  The 
Human Resources & Services Administration contracts with a private, 
non-profit corporation (the United Network for Organ Sharing or 
“UNOS”) to operate the OPTN and to develop allocation policies—
based, in large part, on the medical science developed by its own 
membership—in light of normative mandates from Congress and the 
Department of Health & Human Services.  The District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania skirted several fundamental questions 
about the legitimacy and constitutionality of this arrangement when it 
temporarily restrained the OPTN/UNOS from treating a ten-year-old 
lung transplant candidate differently than adults in her position on the 
lung waitlist;1 a subsequent transplant mooted her claim, leaving 
consideration of its merits to another day.  This Article picks up where 
that transplant candidate’s story left off and is the first to critically 
examine the OPTN/UNOS vis-à-vis issues of quasi-governmental 
regulation, political oversight, judicial deference to scientific agencies, 
and notice-and-comment rulemaking outside the scope of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 
 
I. THE NETWORK 
In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ Transplant Act 
(“NOTA” or “the Act”) to facilitate the development of nationwide organ 
transplantation policies.2  The Act created the OPTN, a “private, 
 
 1  This Article treats the OPTN and UNOS as a single entity (“the OPTN/UNOS” or “the 
Network”), except in cases where it draws legal or factual distinctions between the shell (the 
OPTN) and its operator (UNOS). 
 2  National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 273 et seq. (2012)).  See generally Jed A. Gross, E Pluribus UNOS: 
The National Organ Transplant Act and Its Postoperative Complications, 8 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 145 (2013) (providing a comprehensive social, technological, and 
legislative history leading to the passage of NOTA). 
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nonprofit entity” charged with establishing both “a national list of 
individuals who need organs” and “a national system . . . to match organs 
and individuals included in the list.”3  Until this time, organ sharing had 
only occurred within a voluntary network of hospitals; NOTA 
“transformed th[at] voluntary network . . . into a formal [one] with 
effectively mandatory membership and governance by the OPTN.”4  
Since 1986, UNOS has been under contract with the Health Resources 
and Services Administration (“HRSA” is a division of the U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services (“HHS” or “the Department”)) 
to operate the OPTN.5 
The Act requires that the OPTN’s allocation policies distribute 
“organs equitably among transplant patients.”6  Implementing this 
directive, the Department published a final rule instructing the OPTN 
Board of Directors (“the Board”) to draft policies “based on sound 
medical judgment . . . to achieve the best use of donated organs” (“the 
Final Rule”).7  The Final Rule authorizes the Board—comprised of 
transplant physicians; transplant candidates, recipients, and family 
members; and representatives of organ procurement organizations 
(“OPOs”), transplant hospitals, and the general public—to develop these 
policies,8 and the Board has delegated this authority to various organ-
specific and trans-substantive committees.9  Those committees utilize 
 
 3  42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(A); cf. Gross, supra note 2, at 250 (“Congress took pains to 
emphasize the non-governmental nature of the network, for example, by calling it the ‘Organ 
Procurement and Transplantation Network’ . . . rather than the ‘United States Transplantation 
Network’ . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 4  DAVID L. WEIMER, MEDICAL GOVERNANCE: VALUES, EXPERTISE, AND INTERESTS IN 
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 73 (2010). 
 5  UNOS is a private non-profit organization.  About, UNOS, 
http://www.unos.org/about/index.php/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).  UNOS was established in 
1977 by the privately incorporated South-Eastern Regional Organ Procurement Foundation—
a voluntary network of eighteen transplant centers that had grown out of an organization 
originally funded by the Public Health Service in 1969—to facilitate donor-recipient organ 
matching.  WEIMER, supra note 4, at 45 (“[B]y 1983, UNOS was the only organization 
operating a nationwide system to support organ sharing.” (citation omitted)).  See generally 
Wisconsin v. Shalala, No. 00-C-155-C, 2000 WL 34234002, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 22, 2000) 
(noting that the OPTN-operator contract with UNOS has been renewed several times). 
 6  42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(D) (emphasis added). 
 7  42 C.F.R. § 121.8(a)(1)–(2) (2015); see Organ Procurement & Transplantation 
Network, 63 Fed. Reg. 16,296, 16,297 (April 2, 1998), codified at 42 C.F.R. § 121. 
 8  See 42 C.F.R. § 121.3(a); id. § 121.4(a); see also Final Rule, OPTN, 
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/about-the-optn/final-rule/ (last visited Nov. 7, 
2016); Stuart C. Sweet & Gena Boyle, The OPTN/UNOS Policy Development Cycle: 
Challenges and Opportunities, 3 CURRENT TRANSPLANTATION REPORTS 75, 75–78 (2016) 
(describing “the typical policy development process” to include (1) identification of a 
problem, (2) developing a policy proposal, (3) public comment, and (4) post-implementation 
monitoring), available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40472-016-0086-9. 
 9  The organ-specific committees are Kidney, Liver & Intestinal Organ, Pancreas, and 
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Network-specific notice-and-comment procedures,10 which allow for 
input from the Network’s membership and other interested parties.11  Yet, 
the Final Rule purports to establish that “significant” policies 
promulgated by the Network are not “enforceable” until approved by the 
Secretary of HHS (“the Secretary”).12 
Regardless, while the Network is responsible for establishing 
allocation policies, it falls to fifty-eight federally-designated OPOs to 
apply those policies during the real-time distribution of organs to patients 
awaiting transplantation (“candidates”).13  Each of these OPOs facilitates 
transplants from deceased donors within its exclusive geographically 
defined donation service area (“DSA”) to candidates at transplant centers 
around the country.14  Ten years after NOTA was signed into law, 
Congress amended the Social Security Act to require—as a prerequisite 
to Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement—that hospitals and OPOs 
comply with Network policies (including establishing agreements 
whereby hospitals notify OPOs of potential organ donors).15 
Once a person is consented to be an organ donor,16 the local OPO 
 
Thoracic Organ. Committees, OPTN, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/members/ 
committees/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).  And, the trans-substantive committees normally 
involved in organ allocation policy development include Ethics, Executive, 
Histocompatibility, Membership & Professional Standards, Minority Affairs, OPO, Patient 
Affairs, Pediatric Transplantation, and Policy Oversight.  Id. 
 10  42 C.F.R. § 121.4(b)(1); see Making OPTN Policy, OPTN, 
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/policies/making-optn-policy/  
(last visited Nov. 7, 2016); see also Policy Notices, OPTN, 
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/policy-notices/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016); Public 
Comment, OPTN, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/public-comment/ (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2016). 
 11  See Martin A. Strosberg & Ron W. Gimbel, The Public Administration of Organ 
Allocation: Maintaining the Public-Private Partnership, 7 PUB. ADMIN. & MGMT. 229, 232 
(“UNOS . . . adopts policies with organized input from the public and the general 
membership.”).  The independent organizational members of the OPTN/UNOS include 254 
transplant centers, fifty-eight OPOs, fifty-eight histocompatibility laboratories, and thirty 
professional and voluntary organizations. See WEIMER, supra note 4, at 51. 
 12  42 C.F.R. § 121.4(b)(2).  
 13  About AOPO, ASSOCIATION OF ORGAN PROCUREMENT ORGANIZATIONS, 
http://www.aopo.org/about-aopo/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016); see WEIMER, supra note 4, at 49 
(“Each OPO has a monopoly over procuring organs from cadavers in hospitals within its 
geographic area.  Fifty of the OPOs are independent organizations that harvest cadaveric 
organs from multiple hospitals.  The other eight are operated by transplant centers based in 
specific hospitals and do not hold independent membership in the OPTN.”). 
 14  WEIMER, supra note 4, at 49.  Transplant centers are hospitals where transplants are 
performed. 42 C.F.R. § 121.2; see OPO Report, SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY OF TRANSPLANT 
RECIPIENTS, http://www.srtr.org/csr/current/opo-report.aspx/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). 
 15  Social Security Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-432, 108 Stat. 4398 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8(a)(1) (2012)). 
 16  This may be either by first-person consent (e.g., during registration at the DMV), or 
by the consent of the donor’s legal next-of-kin. 
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uploads the donor’s social and medical information onto an online 
UNOS-operated donor-recipient matching system called DonorNetSM.17  
Using DonorNetSM, an OPO representative generates one or more organ-
specific “matchruns” that sort and rank all the candidates who may be 
compatible for each organ to be offered.18  The sequence of candidates 
on each unique matchrun is determined automatically based on 
algorithms that reflect the allocation policies that are operative at the time 
the matchrun is generated.19 
While the allocation policies vary by organ type, they all share some 
commonalities.20  First, with few exceptions, organs from deceased 
donors are initially offered to candidates geographically nearest the 
donor, then to candidates farther away.21  Second, despite the Act’s 
mandate to distribute organs “equitably,” the Network is still expected to 
specifically “address the unique health care needs of children.”22  So, all 
allocation policies include some division between children and adults.23  
Third, all allocation policies provide transplant surgeons discretion when 
considering offers for candidates listed at their center since “decisions 
about who should receive a particular organ in a particular situation 
involve levels of detail, subtlety and urgency that must be judged by 
transplant professionals.”24 
II. THE CASE 
In December 2011, the transplant team at Children’s Hospital of 
Philadelphia (“CHOP”) sought to employ its discretion when it 
determined that Sarah Murnaghan—a then-ten-year-old girl with cystic 
fibrosis listed for a bilateral lung transplant—was medically eligible to 
receive lungs from an adult where the donor’s lungs would be 
“downsized” to fit her.25  Due to her progressively worsening health, 
 
 17  How organs are matched, UNOS, https://www.unos.org/transplantation/ 
matching-organs/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. 
 20  Complaint for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [hereinafter 
Complaint], Exhibit C (Letter from John P. Roberts, President, OPTN/UNOS, to Kathleen 
Sebelius, Secretary, HHS [hereinafter Roberts] Murnaghan v. Sebelius, No. 13-CV-03083, 
2013 WL 3363500 (E.D. Penn. June 5, 2013)). 
 21  See id.  (noting that geographic proximity minimizes organ preservation time and 
maximizes the chance of a successful transplant). 
 22  42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(M). 
 23  See generally Policies, OPTN, available at https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ 
governance/policies. 
 24  See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,650, 56,652 
(Oct. 20, 1999). 
 25  See Complaint, supra note 20, at 10–11; see also Roberts, supra note 20 (noting that 
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Sarah was admitted to CHOP in May 2013.26  Unfortunately for Sarah, 
high-quality lungs from adult donors were being routinely accepted for 
adult candidates who were ranked ahead of her on the waitlist due to the 
so-called “Under 12 Rule.”27 
A. The Under 12 Rule 
The Network’s lung allocation policy draws a distinction between 
those individuals age twelve or older and those under twelve years old.28  
On the one hand, if a candidate is age twelve or older, their medical team 
will calculate a lung allocation score (“LAS”), which provides transplant 
physicians with a quantitative assessment of the candidate’s mortality 
before—and survival benefit after—transplantation.29  A candidate’s 
priority on lung matchruns is based on their LAS: candidates with a 
higher LAS receive offers first within their DSA.30  On the other hand, 
candidates under age twelve do not receive an LAS score.31  As a result, 
these pre-adolescent candidates are last in line to receive offers from adult 
donors, after all adolescent and adult candidates have refused.32 
 
some thoracic transplant surgeons opt to excise one or more lobes from a larger donor’s lungs 
for transplant into a smaller recipient and that studies have shown that outcomes are 
comparable to whole lung transplants despite the added complexity). 
 26  Complaint, supra note 20, at 3. 
 27  Hearing Regarding Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [hereinafter TRO 
Hearing], Murnaghan, 2013 WL 3363500, at 27:00–28:01.  In the months following her 
admission, Sarah’s transplant team received and rejected several lung offers that already had 
been refused by higher-ranked adult candidates, which they considered to be of inadequate 
medical quality.  Id. at 33:10. 
 28  See generally Sarah O’Brien, The Impact and Implications of Sarah Murnaghan on 
the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network’s Lung Allocation Policy and a 
Proposal for Further Change, 18 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 99, 111–17 (2015). 
 29  Roberts, supra note 20 (the LAS is based in part on the candidate’s medical diagnosis, 
blood analyses, and lung function). 
 30  Roberts, supra note 20. 
 31  Why the Under 12 Rule was promulgated is a matter of some debate in the medical 
community.  Compare Keren Ladin & Douglas W. Hanto, Rationing Lung Transplants—
Procedural Fairness in Allocation and Appeals, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 599, 599 (2013) 
(“Such scores were assigned only to patients 12 or older, because there were insufficient data 
to support their applicability to younger populations, owing to their different diagnoses and 
limited outcomes data.” (citation omitted)) with Thomas M. Egan & Stuart C. Sweet, 
Rationing Lung Transplants, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2064, 2064 (2013) (“Ladin and Hanto 
ignore critical references. The decision to exclude children younger than 12 years of age from 
receiving allocation scores was based on careful data review; it did not result from insufficient 
data.”) (citation omitted)).  See also Ciera Parish, Rules Are Meant to Be Broken: The Organ 
Procurement and Transplantation Network Should Allow Pediatric Transplantation of Adult 
Lungs, 28 J.L. & HEALTH 319, 333–36 (2015) (describing the purpose of the Under 12 Rule). 
 32  Roberts, supra note 20. 
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B. The Secretary 
Around the time of her admission to CHOP, Sarah’s parents sought 
to change the Under 12 Rule by publishing a petition to be delivered to 
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius and Board President Dr. John P. Roberts.33  
In response, the Network stated that the Murnaghans’ request for special 
review could not be considered.34  Nevertheless, on May 31, 2013, 
Secretary Sebelius directed the Network to “identify[] any potential 
improvements to th[e lung allocation] policy that would make more 
transplants available to children, consistent with the requirements of the 
[Final Rule].”35 
On June 3, 2013, Sarah’s parents’ attorney wrote to Secretary 
Sebelius, arguing that the Under 12 Rule was flawed and discriminatory, 
and directly requesting that the Secretary suspend the rule for Sarah on 
an emergency basis.36  The next day, at an unrelated budgetary hearing 
before the House Education and Labor Committee, three congressmen 
pressed Sebelius to grant the Murnaghans’ request.37  One congressman, 
in particular, compared Sarah’s situation to “deny[ing] a[n] organ 
transplant based on somebody’s race, . . . skin [color], . . . or 
gender . . . .”38  Sebelius refused, suggesting that the allocation “rules that 
are in place and reviewed on a regular basis are there because the worst 
of all worlds in my mind is to have some individual pick and choose who 
lives and who dies.  I think you want a process where it’s guided by 
medical science and medical experts.”39 
 
 33  See Allow Transplant of Adult Lungs to Children, CHANGE.ORG, 
http://www.change.org/petitions/allow-transplants-of-adult-lungs-to-children/ (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2016). 
 34  OPTN statement regarding lung transplantation and pediatric priority, OPTN (May 
27, 2013), https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/news/optn-statement-regarding-lung-
transplantation-and-pediatric-priority/ (“OPTN policies allow status adjustments for 
specifically defined groups of candidates with unique medical circumstances not addressed 
by the overall policy.  A request to adjust the status of a patient under age 12 so that they may 
be included in the allocation sequence for adolescents and adults is not within the scope of 
the existing lung allocation policy.”). 
 35  Complaint, Exhibit G (Letter from Secretary Sebelius to Dr. Roberts), supra note 20.  
See generally 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(d) (If “[a]ny interested individual” submits to the Secretary 
comments critical of the OPTN’s policies, the Secretary will consider those comments, and 
upon review, may take any action the Secretary deems appropriate, including “direct[ing] the 
OPTN to revise the policies or practices.”). 
 36  Complaint, Exhibit A (Letter from Stephen G. Harvey, attorney representing Sarah 
Murnaghan, to Secretary Sebelius), supra note 20 (noting that the Network’s review of the 
lung allocation policy could take months, during which Sarah would die). 
 37  See Rep. John Kline Holds a Hearing on the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Budget 
Before the H. Educ. & Labor Comm., 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter HHS Hearing] 
(statements of Reps. Thomas Price, Lou Barletta, and Glenn Thompson). 
 38  Id. (statement of Rep. Lou Barletta). 
 39  Id. (statement of Sec’y Kathleen Sebelius). 
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C. The Order 
On June 5, 2013, Sarah’s parents filed a motion in the District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for a temporary restraining order 
(“TRO”) enjoining the Secretary and the Network from applying the 
Under 12 Rule.40  The complaint alleged two overarching violations of 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”): (1) that the Under 12 Rule 
was “not in accordance with law;” and (2) that the Secretary’s failure to 
set it aside was “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.”41  
During a hearing held the same day, Sarah’s pulmonologist testified that 
the Under 12 Rule was “arbitrary;”42 that Sarah would only survive two 
to four more weeks without a transplant;43 and that, were Sarah assigned 
an LAS, she would have a high chance of receiving lungs before her 
death.44 
The court issued the TRO, limiting its application to Sarah.45  That 
night, UNOS adjusted its allocation algorithm to implement the order.46  
In a supplemental memorandum to its order, the court noted that the TRO 
did not direct a lung to Sarah, or place Sarah at the front of the line for 
lungs; rather, the order merely restrained the Network from 
disadvantaging Sarah based on her age.47 
On June 6, 2013, the OPTN/UNOS Thoracic and Pediatric 
Committees convened an emergency joint teleconference to “determine 
 
 40  Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 18. 
 41  Id. ¶¶ 52–62. 
 42  TRO Hearing, supra note 27, at 17:43. 
 43  TRO Hearing, supra note 27, at 22:30.  
 44  TRO Hearing, supra note 27, at 29:00 (noting that Sarah would be listed in the ninety-
fifth percentile in terms of medical severity). 
 45  Order, Murnaghan, 2013 WL 3363500, at 2 (June 5, 2013).  That said, the mother of 
another child waiting on the lung waitlist—an eleven-year-old named Javier Martinez—
obtained a similar TRO and preliminary injunction from the same court the very next day, 
represented by the Murnaghans’ attorney.  See Parish, supra note 31, at 338–39 (citations 
omitted). 
 46  Roberts, supra note 20. 
 47  Supplemental Mem., Murnaghan, 2013 WL 3363500, at 2 (June 7, 2013).  This was a 
repetition of a caveat the court announced during the TRO hearing.  See TRO Hearing, supra 
note 27, at 41:57–43:25 (“I want to emphasize what the legal issue on the TRO is, as I 
understand it.  And I think this is very important, that, I am not in a position—nor would I 
seek to be—to decide who gets a transplant.  That’s not the function of a judge.  The legal 
issue that’s presented is that the Under 12 Rule is an ‘arbitrary’ and ‘capricious’ rule that is 
[sic] been improperly put into effect by the Secretary of HHS and that it should not block—it 
should not be used to block—Sarah from getting a transplant. And that is really the only legal 
issue.  So, if I were to grant the TRO, it would only apply to Sarah.  And it would not guarantee 
that she would get a transplant.  It would only mean that the Secretary and the people who 
administer the donor program could not keep her in a separate category of ‘Under 12.’  They 
would have to consider her as equal to adults.  So, what I’m being asked to decide here is a 
narrow legal issue.”). 
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if there was sufficient evidence available to support a recommendation to 
modify the current pediatric lung allocation policy urgently.”48  After a 
review of data provided by the Scientific Registry of Transplant 
Recipients, the Committees jointly recommended that “the Executive 
Committee [not] take any emergency policy actions . . . regarding 
pediatric lung allocation.”49  Likewise, the OPTN/UNOS Ethics 
Committee saw “significant ethical risk in special review, appeal, or 
exceptions to allocation policies based on a particular candidate’s 
circumstance beyond the exception and review procedures already 
incorporated into Network policy.”50  In particular, the Committee 
expressed concern that the 
circumvention of organ allocation through judicial 
appeals . . . is likely to undermine the main ethical directive 
of an equitable allocation system to maximize the public good 
and achieve justice. Politicians and judges who intervene in a 
complex allocation algorithm may be well-intentioned but 
fail to consider all the moral variables that must be balanced 
at the macro level rather than through an individual 
candidate’s experience.51 
After reviewing these reports, the Executive Committee decided, on June 
10, to permit transplant centers the opportunity to seek individual 
exceptions permitting children below age twelve to avoid the Under 12 
Rule.52  Sarah’s transplant team immediately sought—and was granted—
 
 48  Report of Joint Meeting of the OPTN/UNOS Thoracic and Pediatric Committees to 
the OPTN/UNOS Executive Committee (June 10, 2013), https://web.archive.org 
/web/20140818205607/http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Exec_Co
mm_mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf/ (“The members of the Committees understood that such 
an extreme action should be recommended only if the review of current available evidence 
demonstrated the presence of a systematic, disproportional, imminent disadvantage to 
children as a result of the current allocation system.”). 
 49  Id. 
 50  Memorandum of OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee to OPTN/UNOS Executive 
Committee (June 10, 2013) [hereinafter Ethics Memo], https://web.archive.org/web 
/20140818205607/http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Exec_Comm_
mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf/ (“Appeal to the unique features of specific cases is not an 
appropriate approach to make fairness claims against the complex algorithm of an allocation 
policy.”); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 
1610 (2016) (“Judges face their own challenges. . . . [T]heir information is partial and 
fragmentary, often a kind of cartoon.  It is a product of the adversary process, run by lawyers, 
which can lead to distorted and wildly inadequate perspectives.  Judges cannot possibly have 
an adequate sense of the full range of issues with which executive officials must deal.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 51  Ethics Memo, supra note 50; see Ladin & Hanto, supra note 31, at 599 (“Appeals 
waged through federal courts and the court of public opinion . . . undermine fairness. . . . 
Lawsuits also inappropriately saddle courts with decisions about health policy.  Finally, 
appeals reduce transparency and predictability, undermining the public perception of fairness, 
which could reduce donation rates.”). 
 52  Summary of Actions Taken at June 10, 2013, OPTN/UNOS Executive Committee 
Meeting (June 11, 2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20150415092740 
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such an exception.53 
No longer encumbered by the Under 12 Rule, Sarah underwent a 
bilateral lung transplant from an adult donor on June 12.54  Unfortunately, 
those lungs failed almost immediately, forcing Sarah onto a heart-lung 
bypass machine for three days before she could be re-transplanted with a 
second pair of adult lungs.55  No longer dependent on the operation of the 
TRO, and hence without the need to convert the TRO into a preliminary 
injunction, the Murnaghans dismissed their suit.56 
Due to the dismissal, the court never reached the merits of Sarah’s 
claim, i.e., it never received briefing on NOTA, the OPTN, UNOS, the 
Final Rule, or the Under 12 Rule.  Indeed, the court appears to have issued 
the TRO on the assumption that organ allocation policies such as the 
Under 12 Rule are “regulation[s]” due deference under Chevron: 
[O]ne of the damning aspects of a regulation is that it’s 
arbitrary, and that is an allegation that the plaintiff has 
made in her complaint here: that it is an arbitrary rule 
and is without medical basis.  And, I think that is 
something that has a lot of weight.  What is a strong 
factor in favor of the defendant is the concept of judicial 
deference to administrative rulemaking and 
administrative agency expertise.  This is commonly 
known as the Chevron rule.57 
The remainder of this Article examines this assumption in the context of 
a several potentially dispositive legal issues that deserved, but did not 
receive, attention in Murnaghan. 
Part III posits that the OPTN is a legally valid quasi-governmental 
 
/http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/Policy_Notice_06-2013.pdf.  Of note, 
this exception-based scheme has since become a permanent component of Network policy.  
See O’Brien, supra note 28, at 155 (“After a period of public comment and a vote by the 
OPTN, the temporary mechanism became permanent on June 23, 2014.” (citations omitted)); 
OPTN, POLICY 10: ALLOCATION OF LUNGS, § 10.2.B, Lung Candidates with Exceptional 
Cases (Oct. 1, 2016), https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ 
media/1200/optn_policies.pdf (“For lung candidates less than 12 years old, transplant 
programs may request classification as an adolescent candidate. . . .”). 
 53  Joint Motion to Postpone Preliminary Injunction Hearing and to Extend Temporary 
Restraining Order, Murnaghan, 2013 WL 3363500, at 2 (June 13, 2013). 
 54  Maryclaire Dale & Malcolm Ritter, Sarah Murnaghan’s Surgery Deemed a Success, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 12, 2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20160304104700 
/http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/12/sarah-murnaghan-surgery_n_3431653.html. 
 55  Marie McCullough, Five grave problems reduce Sarah’s survival chances, THE 
INQUIRER (July 3, 2013) (noting that these lungs would normally have been unsuitable for 
transplant due to pneumonia in the donor), https://web.archive.org/web 
/20150920232952/http://articles.philly.com/2013-07-03/news/40331491_1_lungs-
transplant-surgery-sarah-murnaghan. 
 56  Notice of Dismissal Without Prejudice, Murnaghan, 2013 WL 3363500, at 1 (July 8, 
2013). 
 57  TRO Hearing, supra note 27, at 47:56–48:41.  
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agency, and that UNOS, as its operator, is authorized to promulgate 
binding organ allocation policies.  Part IV challenges the Department’s 
Final Rule, arguing that, despite its procedural validity, Congress never 
authorized the Secretary to substantively intervene in the Network’s 
policymaking.  Part V argues that, though the Network’s allocation 
policies are not subject to the APA, they are nonetheless due some 
equitable form of judicial deference.  Finding that these policies reflect 
the Network’s interpretation of a statute (NOTA) and not of a regulation 
(the Final Rule), this Part concludes that Chevron deference may be 
appropriate on the assumption that a court is willing to suspend the 
political accountability norm that is normally a prerequisite to deference 
to agency interpretations of organic statutes. 
Finally, after considering whether the Network is a state actor 
susceptible to constitutional challenges, the Article concludes with a call 
to balance relief from alleged violations of constitutional rights with the 
inherently more abstract concerns of next-in-line candidates and the 
public. 
III. NOTA 
For the Network’s allocation system to survive constitutional 
scrutiny, two showings must be made. First, NOTA must meet the 
demands of the Supreme Court’s nondelegation doctrine.  Second, the 
Network must be able to prove that its policies are designed with 
scientific expertise that is insulated from political interference. 
A. Nondelegation 
Eight decades have passed since the Court has struck down a statute 
for delegating authority either without an “intelligible principle,”58 or to 
a private entity.59  Because NOTA requires the Network to distribute 
“organs equitably among transplant patients” and “address the unique 
health care needs of children,”60 there is unquestionably an “intelligible 
principle” that the Network must abide.61 
 
 58  See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (“In the history of 
the Court we have found the requisite ‘intelligible principle’ lacking in only two statutes, one 
of which provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which 
conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard 
than stimulating the economy by assuring ‘fair competition.’” (citing Panama Refining Co. v. 
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 
495 (1935))).  
 59  See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (noting that delegation of 
regulatory authority to a private entity is “legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form”). 
 60  See 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(D), (M). 
 61  This is not to say that there are not critics of the “intelligible principle” doctrine.  See, 
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And, until very recently, there would been no doubt about 
Congress’s decision to delegate allocative policymaking authority to the 
Network.62  Indeed, Carter Coal was considered a “dormant doctrine” 
until 2013,63 when the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit held that Congress had impermissibly delegated legislative power 
to Amtrak, which was—in the Circuit’s view—a private entity.64  The 
Supreme Court ultimately vacated the judgment,65 finding instead that 
Amtrak is a governmental entity,66 thereby avoiding the Circuit’s 
attempted revival of Carter Coal.  In separate concurring opinions, 
however, two Justices indicated that Carter Coal’s ban on private 
delegation may have traction in future cases.67 
Emboldened by these concurrences, future lower court decisions 
may strive to prompt the Court to revive Carter Coal. And, given that the 
Network is almost certainly more private than Amtrak, a case like Sarah 
Murnaghan’s could squarely tee up the nondelegation doctrine.68  But, 
with six sitting Justices silent on the issue, there is no indication that a 
majority would be willing to strike down NOTA as an unconstitutional 
delegation of authority to a private entity. 
 
e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s (“American Railroads”), 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1246, 
1250 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Although the Court may never have 
intended the boundless standard the ‘intelligible principle’ test has become, it is evident that 
it does not adequately reinforce the Constitution’s allocation of legislative power. . . . 
[P]erhaps we deliberately . . . bow[ed] to the exigencies of modern Government that were so 
often cited in cases upholding challenged delegations of rulemaking authority.” (citing, e.g., 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“[I]n our increasingly complex society, 
replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job 
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”))). 
 62  See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543, 586 (2000) (“[T]he nondelegation doctrine seems increasingly out of step with 
modern governance.”).  
 63  Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 900–
01 (2014) (citing Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 
1440 (2003)). 
 64  See Ass’n of Am. R.R.s. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 674–77 (D.C. Cir. 
2013), vacated and remanded sub nom. American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225. 
 65  American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. at 1233–34 (remanding for consideration of the 
remaining constitutional issues). 
 66  Id. at 1228. 
 67  See id. at 1237–38 (Alito, J., concurring) (“When it comes to private entities, however, 
there is not even a fig leaf of constitutional justification. . . . By any measure, handing off 
regulatory power to a private entity is ‘legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form.’” 
(quoting Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311)); id. at 1252 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“Because a private entity is neither Congress, nor the President or one of his agents, nor the 
Supreme Court or an inferior court established by Congress, the Vesting Clauses would 
categorically preclude it from exercising the legislative, executive, or judicial powers of the 
Federal Government.”). 
 68  See infra Part V.C.2. 
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B. Constraints 
Separate from any private-delegation concerns, the Network 
operates to some degree as a scientific agency, which means that when 
developing allocation policy, the Network is constrained by two 
interrelated “expertise-forcing” requirements:69  primarily, its policy 
choices must be genuinely coupled with “significant expertise;”70 and, as 
a corollary, that expertise must be insulated from the influence of the 
political branches.71 
i. Expertise 
The Court has found evidence of “significant expertise” when 
Congress requires a medical regulatory “program [to] evolve as 
technological expertise mature[s].”72  Here, Congress expects not only 
that transplantation medicine will “evolve,” but that the Network itself 
will be the entity driving “technological expertise matur[ation].”73  
Indeed, unlike “[r]egulatory science” agencies, like the EPA, which are 
“generally not concerned with . . . advancing the pantheon of human 
knowledge,”74 Congress tasked the OPTN’s leadership not only with 
developing allocation policy, but also with “improv[ing]” the science of 
 
 69  See Adrian Vermeule & Jody Freeman, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to 
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52 (2007) (“Expertise-forcing is the attempt by courts to 
ensure that agencies exercise expert judgment free from outside political pressures, even or 
especially political pressures emanating from the White House or political appointees in the 
agencies.”). 
 70  See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991) (“The identification 
and classification of medical eligibility criteria necessarily require significant expertise and 
entail the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns.  In those circumstances, courts 
appropriately defer to the agency entrusted by Congress to make such policy 
determinations.”); see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (“An agency . . . 
acquire[s] special authority to interpret its own words when . . . using its expertise and 
experience to formulate a regulation . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 71  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007) (holding that, where Congress 
mandates agency action following the agency’s determination of certain circumstances, the 
agency may not pursue contrary presidential priorities absent a “reasonable explanation as to 
why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion”); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000) (“[N]o matter how ‘important, conspicuous, and 
controversial’ the issue, and regardless of how likely the public is to hold the Executive 
Branch politically accountable, an administrative agency’s power to regulate in the public 
interest must always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress.”). 
 72  See BethEnergy, 501 U.S. at 697. 
 73  Cf. id. (deferring to Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of black-lung medical-benefit 
regulations where the Secretary “will make every effort to incorporate within his 
regulations . . . to the extent feasible the advances made by medical science . . . .” (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 74  See Louis J. Virelli III, Scientific Peer Review and Administrative Legitimacy, 61 
ADMIN. L. REV. 723, 736 (2009). 
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transplantation.75  This coupling of responsibilities makes the Network 
rare (if not unique) among governmental and quasi-governmental 
entities, and indicates congressional recognition of “significant 
expertise” sufficient to justify the Network’s authority.76 
On the other hand, one could reasonably contend that the Network’s 
ability to “improve” transplantation science does not necessarily qualify 
the Network to develop allocation policy.77  But, a brief examination of 
UNOS’s history refutes this argument. Whereas the typical scientific 
agency regulates entities that have no experience in self-regulation, 
Congress constructed the OPTN on top of an existing network of 
transplant centers that—prior to the Federal Government’s 
involvement—independently and successfully allocated organs.78  
Indeed, it was this very experience that Congress sought to harness in 
promulgating NOTA.79 
 
 75  See 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(I), (N) (“The [OPTN] shall . . . collect, analyze, and publish 
data concerning organ donation and transplants [and] carry out studies and demonstration 
projects for the purpose of improving procedures for organ donation procurement and 
allocation . . . .”); cf. id. § 274(b)(1)(B) (“The [OPTN] shall . . . have a board of directors that 
includes representatives of [OPOs], transplant centers, [and] voluntary health 
associations . . . .”). 
 76  The Final Rule takes a similar approach in demanding that the Network consistently 
review its policies with an eye toward the application of its expertise.  See 42 C.F.R. 
§ 121.4(e)(2) (“The OPTN shall implement policies and shall . . . [u]pdate policies developed 
in accordance with this section to accommodate scientific and technological advances.”).  
 77  See Strosberg & Gimbel, supra note 11, at 244 (“[T]ransplant professionals have no 
particular expertise on deciding on the tradeoffs between utility and equity.  These tradeoffs 
and associated policies are better made by politicians than transplant professionals.” (citing 
ROBERT VEATCH, TRANSPLANTATION ETHICS (2000))).  See generally Holly Doremus & A. 
Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resource Regulation, 26 PUB. 
LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 17 (2005) (“[T]he real battleground in arguments about the 
use of science . . . is typically not the data . . . but the . . . judgments used to interpret and 
translate the data into regulations.”). 
 78  WEIMER, supra note 4, at 95 (“Voluntary sharing by UNOS was already under way 
when the OPTN was created, so that its members had considerable experience with 
cooperating as well as plausible starting points from which allocation policy could begin to 
evolve.”). 
 79  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 98th Cong. 175 (1983) [hereinafter NOTA Hearing] (statement of Rep. Al Gore) 
(“We have heard three times now the statement that, what is proposed is a Federal 
Government takeover of the system when, in fact, nothing of the sort is proposed. The private 
systems would continue in place. The program would still be run by the same people.”); see 
David L. Weimer, Public and Private Regulation of Organ Transplantation: Liver Allocation 
and the Final Rule, 32 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y & L. 9, 44 (2007) (“OPTN committees have 
a heavy representation of transplant surgeons who bring the sort of tacit knowledge—
information and understanding based on firsthand experience and observation—that is 
extremely useful in identifying potential issues . . . [and] in predicting the likely consequences 
of proposed rule changes. Many of these surgeons also contribute to the medical literature on 
transplantation, which gives them considerable experience in dealing with empirical 
evidence.”).  Contra, e.g., Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 266–67 (“The structure of the [Controlled 
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ii. Insulation 
But, even Congress’s recognition of “significant expertise” is not 
enough to meet the expertise-forcing requirement unless the Network can 
also demonstrate that NOTA satisfies the political-insulation corollary in 
two ways: one legal, one factual.  First, as a matter of law, the Network 
can show that there is no statutory conduit through which political 
influence may validly affect substantive changes to allocation policy.80  
Here, NOTA only authorizes procedural checks by the Secretary.81 
Moreover, even assuming that—in certain contexts—a substantive 
executive regulation may open a conduit for political influence, this is not 
that context.  Though the Final Rule purports to endow the Secretary with 
substantive override authority, that authority is ultra vires of NOTA.82  
Hence, as a matter of law, the Network is insulated from political 
influence. 
Second, even if, as a matter of law, NOTA did authorize the 
involvement of the political branches in substantive allocation 
policymaking, the Network could demonstrate that any particular policy 
being challenged was, as a matter of fact, promulgated free of such 
influence.83  During a congressional hearing years after the promulgation 
of the Under 12 Rule, Secretary Sebelius resisted political pressure to 
intervene in Sarah’s case,84 clarifying that “the OPTN . . . is not 
bureaucrats, it’s transplant surgeons and health care providers,” and that 
these experts develop allocation policy “based on their best medical 
judgment of the most appropriate way to decide allocation in an 
 
Substances Act], then, conveys unwillingness to cede medical judgments to an executive 
official [the Attorney General] who lacks medical expertise.” (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted)). 
 80  See Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533 (finding that where congressional design mandates 
the use of policymaking authority by a scientific agency, contrary political priorities may not 
interfere); see also Vermeule & Freeman, supra note 69, at 89 (“State Farm is expertise-
forcing in the sense that the Court expects the agency to make discretionary policy decisions 
that can be justified by the relevant statutory factors, and not politics.”).  Contra Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A change in administration brought 
about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive 
agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations.”). 
 81  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 82  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 83  See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42 (holding that “a reviewing court may not set aside an 
agency rule that is rational [and] based on consideration of the relevant factors”). 
 84  See HHS Hearing, supra note 37 (statement of Rep. Barletta) (“[Y]ou are the one 
person who has the authority to suspend the current policy until we are confident that children 
have equal access to lifesaving treatment and aren’t discriminated against because of their 
age. . . . I’m begging you. Sarah has three to five weeks to live.  Time is running out. Please, 
suspend the rules until we look at this policy, which we all believe is flawed.”). 
BRUGGEBREW.DOCX 8/30/2017  12:19 PM 
16 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 41:1 
impossibly difficult situation.”85  In essence, Secretary Sebelius was 
contending that the Under 12 Rule was an allocation policy 
promulgated—as a matter of fact—by the Network using its “best 
medical judgment,”86 and that it would be inappropriate for the policy to 
be superseded by politics. 
IV. THE FINAL RULE 
The Department’s attempt to establish substantive override authority 
through the Final Rule, then, was invalid.  While the Final Rule was 
promulgated in technical compliance with the APA, its provision 
purporting to authorize the Secretary to oversee the substance of the 
Network’s allocation policies has no statutory foundation and is an 
example of impermissible self-aggrandizement by an agency. 
A. Promulgation 
On September 8, 1994, the Department published a notice of 
proposed rulemaking for a rule governing the operation of the OPTN.87  
The rule would have required the OPTN to propose policies to the 
Secretary; and, “[i]f the Secretary object[ed] to a policy, the OPTN may 
[have] be[en] directed to revise the policy consistent with the Secretary’s 
direction.”88  The proposed rule “recognized the [OPTN]’s exclusive 
statutory authority to develop organ allocation policy,” but reserved for 
the Secretary the power to oversee policy development in order to ensure 
that allocation remained “fair and equitable.”89  Most transplant centers 
 
 85  See id. (statement of Sec’y Sebelius). See generally NOTA Hearing, supra note 79, at 
2 (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman) (“We must also avoid the chaos and bitterness that 
inevitably will arise if transplants are available only to . . . those fortunate enough to be 
singled out by the media for special attention.”).  At the time the Secretary made her remarks, 
she may have been acutely sensitive to the issue of political influence in agency rulemaking.  
An April 5, 2013 order issued out of the District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
had included language that her then-recent decision regarding Plan B availability had been 
“arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.” Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 187 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]hree distinguished scientists, including the Editor-in-Chief of the New 
England Journal of Medicine, wrote: ‘In our opinion, the secretary’s decision to retain behind-
the-counter status for Plan B One-Step was based on politics rather than science.’” (quoting 
Alastair J.J. Wood, Jeffrey M. Drazen, & Michael F. Greene, The Politics of Emergency 
Contraception, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 102 (2012))). 
 86  Cf. HHS Hearing, supra note 37 (statement of Sec’y Sebelius) (“What I have been told 
by the transplant experts—and I don’t profess to have any expertise in this area—is that . . . a 
delineation between pediatric and adult lungs [is] based on . . . survivability . . . .”). 
 87  Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network, 59 Fed. Reg. 48,482, 46,496 (Sept. 
8, 1994). 
 88  Id. at 46,498. 
 89  Wisconsin, 2000 WL 34234002, at *4. 
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responded “cool[ly],” preferring “minimal federal oversight.”90  The 
Department did not adopt the proposed rule.91 
But, two years later, on November 13, 1996, the Department revived 
the rulemaking, reopened the docket for comments, and held a three-day 
hearing where “[m]ore than one hundred witnesses testified, 
and . . . more than six hundred [unique] letters were submitted . . . .”92  
Nearly ninety-nine percent of physicians, and more than ninety percent 
of patients and families, opposed a stronger government role in allocation 
policy development.93 
Then, on April 2, 1998, the Department announced a final rule.94  In 
the section “OPTN policies: Secretarial review and appeals,” the 
regulation read: 
The Board of Directors shall . . . [p]rovide . . . proposed 
policies to the Secretary, who may provide comments and/or 
objections . . . . If the Secretary objects to the policy, the 
OPTN may be directed to revise the policy consistent with 
the Secretary’s direction. [I]f the Secretary . . . disagrees with 
[the revised] content, the Secretary may take such other 
action as the Secretary determines appropriate.95 
Then-Secretary Donna Shalala announced that this rule would “vest[] 
ultimate control of organ allocation policy with [the Secretary] instead of 
with the [OPTN].”96  Resistance to the rule mounted in the transplant 
 
 90  WEIMER, supra note 4, at 77. 
 91  Wisconsin, 2000 WL 34234002, at *4. 
 92  WEIMER, supra note 4, at 78–79. 
 93  WEIMER, supra note 4, at 79 (citation omitted).  
 94  See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text. 
 95  63 Fed. Reg. at 16,334, codified at 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(b)(2). 
 96  Wisconsin, 2000 WL 34234002, at *4; Dulcinea A. Grantham, Transforming 
Transplantation: The Effect of the Health and Human Services Final Rule on the Organ 
Allocation System, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 751, 780 (2001) (“This provision gives the Secretary the 
power to unilaterally accept or reject any policy proposed by OPTN.” (citing 42 C.F.R. 
§ 121.4(b))). 
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community and Congress.97  After nearly two years of delays,98 the 
Department responded by including a new subsection in the Federal 
Register titled “Discussions with the Transplant Community: Secretarial 
Oversight and Enforceability of OPTN Policies”: 
It is not the desire, nor is it the intention, of the department to 
interfere in the practice of medicine.  Decisions about who 
should receive a particular organ in a particular situation 
involve levels of detail, subtlety and urgency that must be 
judged by transplant professionals . . . . [T]he Secretary’s 
review is intended to ensure consistency between OPTN 
policies and [NOTA].99 
Notwithstanding this protestation, the language of the Final Rule itself 
nonetheless purports to vest in the Secretary precisely the same oversight 
authority proposed in 1994, 1996, and 1998. 
Procedurally, the consistency of content in the Final Rule satisfies 
the rather lax “logical outgrowth” doctrine.100  Under this doctrine, “an 
agency, in its notice of proposed rulemaking, need not identify precisely 
every potential regulatory change, [but] the notice must be sufficiently 
descriptive to provide interested parties with a fair opportunity to 
comment and to participate in the rulemaking.”101  Here, the only 
substantive change to the oversight provision from the original proposal 
was that the Secretary would be required to “refer significant proposed 
polices to the Advisory Committee on Organ Transplantation” before 
recommending reconsideration or requiring modification.102  Given that 
the transplant community had a full opportunity to—and did—voice its 
concerns about the Secretary’s claim to substantive oversight, the 
 
 97  Grantham, supra note 96 at 759 (quoting Putting Patients First: Resolving Allocation 
of Transplant Organs: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Env’t of the House 
Comm. on Commerce and the Sen. Labor & Human Res. Comm., 105th Cong. 138 (1998) 
[hereinafter Putting Patients First Hearing] (statement of Dr. Lawrence G. Hunsicker, 
President, UNOS) (“[T]he proposed HHS [Rule] causes the transplant community great 
concern.”)); Wisconsin, 2000 WL 34234002, at *5 (“An overwhelming majority of leading 
experts within the transplant community condemned the final rule.”); WEIMER, supra note 4, 
at 88–89 (“Rep. Michael Bilirakis introduced a bill to overturn the HHS Final Rule, stating in 
the floor debate that medical experts and not Secretary Shalala know best when it comes to 
transplant policy.  [The bill] nullified the rule and prevented HHS from asserting final 
authority over allocation policies.  On April 4, 2000, it passed the House 275 to 147 . . . [but 
w]ith the anticipated difficulty of resolving the large differences between the House and 
Senate bills in conference committee, and the promised veto of any bill similar to the House 
version by President Clinton, the 106th Congress ended without legislation on organ 
allocation.” (parentheticals and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 98  See generally Wisconsin, 2000 WL 34234002, at *5. 
 99  64 Fed. Reg. at 56,652. 
 100  See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174 (2007). 
 101  Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1104 (4th Cir. 1985) (citations 
omitted). 
 102  64 Fed. Reg. at 56,659, codified as amended at 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(b)(2). 
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provision cannot plausibly be argued to be anything but a “logical 
outgrowth” of the originally noticed proposal.103  Nonetheless, even this 
highly deferential doctrine does not tolerate rules that fall outside the 
“statutory grant of authority.”104 
B. Oversight Provision 
So, the dispositive question is whether NOTA provides a “statutory 
grant of authority” for the secretarial oversight provision.  This Part 
concludes that NOTA expressly authorizes secretarial review of the 
Network’s procedures for developing allocation policies, but leaves no 
room for her to overrule or revise their substance. 
i. Procedural Oversight 
NOTA authorizes the Secretary to “establish procedures for . . . 
receiving . . . critical comments relating to the manner in which the 
[OPTN] is carrying out the duties of the Network . . . ; and [for] the 
consideration by the Secretary of such critical comments.”105  Since one 
of the “duties of the Network” is “establish[ing] . . . medical criteria for 
allocating organs,”106 the necessary inference is that NOTA empowers 
the Secretary to consider the procedures by which the Network develops 
allocation policies.  Consistent with this inference, the Final Rule 
authorizes the Secretary to “revise” those procedures or take “other action 
as the Secretary determines appropriate.”107  In Murnaghan, Sarah’s 
parents implicitly relied on this procedural oversight authority when they 
claimed that the Under 12 Rule violated the Final Rule because it had 
never been published in the Federal Register for public comment.108  But, 
 
 103  See BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 642 (1st Cir. 1979) (“Even 
substantial changes in the original plan may be made so long as they are in character with the 
original scheme and a logical outgrowth of the notice and comment already given.  The 
essential inquiry is whether the commenters have had a fair opportunity to present their views 
on the contents of the final plan.  We must be satisfied, in other words, that given a new 
opportunity to comment, commenters would not have their first occasion to offer new and 
different criticisms which the Agency might find convincing.” (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 104  Long Island Care, 551 U.S. at 173–74. 
 105  42 U.S.C. § 274(c) (emphasis added). 
 106  Id. § 274(b)(2)(B). 
 107  See 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(d)(2)–(3). 
 108  Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 60. Separately, Sarah claimed that the “Secretary’s action 
not to set aside the Under 12 Policy was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion . . . .” 
Id. ¶¶ 13, 62 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2007) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary . . . .”)).  However, a decision not to 
employ enforcement authority is “committed to agency discretion by law.”  See Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832, 835 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not to take enforcement 
action should be presumed immune from judicial review . . . .” (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2))).  
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this claim was without merit. 
The Final Rule states that allocation policies will be published in the 
Federal Register in two circumstances (one mandatory, one 
discretionary), neither of which were inapplicable with respect to the 
Under 12 Rule.  First, when a policy is “significant,” the Secretary 
“will . . . publish [it] in the Federal Register for public comment.”109  
Though the Murnaghans noted that “[n]one of the OPTN policies [have 
been] published in the Federal Register,”110 they failed to demonstrate 
that either the Under 12 Rule, or the overarching lung allocation policy,111 
were “significant.”112  Without this affirmative showing, the mandatory 
Federal Register publication provision does not apply.  Second, the Final 
Rule also states that the Secretary “may” publish “other proposed 
policies” in the Federal Register.113  But, a plaintiff cannot establish a 
cause of action by relying on a regulation that puts unqualified discretion 
in the hands of an executive officer.114 
ii. Substantive Oversight 
In the alternative, the Murnaghans claimed that the Under 12 Rule 
substantively violated the Final Rule.115  Here, the threshold question is 
whether NOTA empowers the Secretary to overturn the Network’s 
 
So, even assuming, for purposes of Sarah’s claim, that the Secretary actually had authority to 
override allocation policies, the Department could demonstrate that the Network had, on the 
Department’s behalf and within NOTA’s parameters, employed its “reasoned” expertise.  See 
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.  And, since the “agency is far better equipped than the courts to 
deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities,” a court should 
not feel compelled to issue an order requiring the Department to set the Under 12 Rule aside.  
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192–93 (1993) (finding unreviewable the agency’s 
redistribution of “lump-sum appropriations,” which allow an agency to “adapt to changing 
circumstances” (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831)).  In the words of Justice Marshall in his 
concurrence to Heckler: “[a]s long as the [Network] is choosing how to allocate finite . . . 
[transplant organ] resources, [its] choice will be entitled to substantial deference, for the 
choice among valid alternative . . . policies is precisely the sort of choice over which agencies 
generally have been left substantial discretion by their enabling statutes.  On the merits, then, 
a decision . . . based on valid resource-allocation decisions will generally not be ‘arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’” Cf. 470 U.S. at 
842 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted). 
 109  42 C.F.R. § 121.4(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 110  Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 24. 
 111  Policy 10: Allocation of Lungs, OPTN, (Oct 1, 2016), available at 
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/1200/optn_policies.pdf. 
 112  This raises several questions: what criteria are used to determine whether an allocation 
policy is “significant;” who determines those criteria; are those criteria objective or 
subjective; should a court defer to the Department’s determination that a policy is 
“significant,” and, if so, what form of deference is appropriate?  
 113  42 C.F.R. § 121.4(b)(2). 
 114  See supra note 108. 
 115  Complaint, supra note 20, ¶¶ 58–59. 
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allocation policies when, in her estimation, those policies fail to conform 
with the substantive requirements of the Final Rule.  As noted, NOTA 
authorizes the Secretary to “establish procedures for . . . receiving . . . 
critical comments relating to the manner in which the [OPTN] is carrying 
out the duties of the Network.”116  As a textual matter, this language 
cannot be interpreted to provide the Secretary with substantive oversight 
power.117  To the contrary, according to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, “the manner in which” a 
duty is carried out is categorically a procedural issue.118 
But, even assuming NOTA grants the Department discretion to 
regulate the substance of Network policies, the question would 
nevertheless remain: did the Final Rule supply grounds for the Secretary 
to intrude in Sarah’s situation?  The Murnaghans claimed that the Under 
12 Rule “did not result in the equitable allocation of cadaveric organs” or 
“give greatest consideration to allocating organs based on medical 
urgency.”119  And, indeed, the Final rule requires that the Secretary 
“assess [whether] proposed policies comply with . . . performance 
indicators” that “measure how well each policy” is “achiev[ing] equitable 
allocation of organs among patients” based on “sound medical 
judgment.”120  Yet, fatally to Sarah’s claim, this authority to “assess,” 
found in § 121.8, is not coupled with authority to override.  While the 
Secretary does have override authority over procedure under § 121.4,121 
it would be unreasonable to graft that authority onto § 121.8, which 
addresses substance.122 
In summary, the Department was never required to publish the 
Under 12 Rule in the Federal Register.  And, even if NOTA gave the 
Department leeway to promulgate regulations that would grant the 
Secretary substantive oversight authority (which it does not), the 
Department’s failure to incorporate that authority into the Final Rule left 
Secretary Sebelius powerless to overturn the Under 12 Rule. 
 
 116  42 U.S.C. § 274(c) (emphasis added). 
 117  The legislative history also supports the position that substantive oversight is 
precluded.  See Grantham, supra note 96, at 759 n.58 (quoting Putting Patients First Hearing, 
supra note 97, at 77 (statement of Sec’y Shalala) (“I reiterate that the Department does not 
have a preconceived notion of any allocation policies. We are relying on the transplant 
community to develop the policy.”)). 
 118  See Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Procedural rules . . . 
alter the manner in which the parties present themselves or their viewpoints to the agency.” 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 119  See Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 58 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(a)(1)); id. ¶ 59 (citing 42 
C.F.R. § 121.8(b)). 
 120  See 42 C.F.R. § 121.8(a)(1), (b), (c)(1), (f). 
 121  See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 122  Cf. 42 C.F.R. § 121.8(a)–(h) (nowhere containing a secretarial override provision). 
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V. ALLOCATION POLICIES 
Though the Secretary lacked authority to rescind the Under 12 Rule, 
that does not decide the issue whether the court could have struck it down 
as “not in accordance with law.”123  This Part first argues that the 
Network, though not subject to the requirements of the APA, employs a 
parallel notice-and-comment system that nevertheless satisfies the APA’s 
normative concerns. Second, it propounds a novel threshold test for 
determining the applicability of Chevron deference to quasi-
governmental entities, and contends that the Network satisfies that test.  
Finally, it considers whether, when developing allocation policies, the 
Network is a “state actor” subject to claims sounding in the Constitution. 
A. Notice & Comment 
The Murnaghans claimed that “[t]he Under 12 Rule is not in 
accordance with law because [the lung allocation policy] was never 
published in the Federal Register for public comment, in violation of 5 
U.S.C. § 553(b).”124  This claim falters from the start: as a matter of law, 
the Network is not subject to the APA.  Moreover, as a normative matter, 
the procedures that the Network utilizes to develop allocation policies 
adequately address the same concerns that drive the APA’s notice-and-
comment requirements. 
i. Law 
NOTA’s requirement that the OPTN operate a unique notice-and-
comment system signals congressional intent not to subject the Network 
to the APA.125  Congress controls whether an agency “is subject to 
statutes that impose obligations or confer powers upon Government 
entities, such as the [APA].”126  While HHS is certainly an “agency” that 
must conform to § 553(b),127 Congress carved out the OPTN from the 
APA’s informal-rulemaking obligations when it mandated that the OPTN 
“establish [its own] public comment and hearing process . . . similar to 
 
 123  See Complaint, supra note 20, ¶¶ 54–60. 
 124  See Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 60. 
 125  Although, there is not much by way of judicial guidance in situations where, as here, 
Congress has not expressly spoken on the issue. See O’Connell, supra note 63, at 917 (“The 
ultimate result for all of these statutes is similar: there are no bright lines for boundary 
organizations.  This ambiguity derives from a dearth of decisions as well as inconsistency 
among the tests used and decisions made. Administrative law scholars have said little about 
this confusion.” (citation omitted)). 
 126  Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995). 
 127  The APA applies to any entity that is an “agency,” i.e., to any “authority of the 
Government of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2007). 
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the process required of government agencies.”128  And, indeed, the 
Network has complied with its mandate. Its notice-and-comment system 
is “similar to”—but distinct from—the APA.129  So, as a matter of law, 
allocation policies are not subject to § 553(b).130 
ii. Policy 
But, even though the Network is not subject to the APA, the demand 
for a similar notice-and-comment process demonstrates congressional 
intent that the APA’s fundamental principles—transparency, 
accountability, and participation131—also undergird allocation policy.  
For this reason, it is important that the Network avoid two major pitfalls 
of regulated resource allocation: ossification and capture. 
Organ allocation is unlike most decision-making at the federal level, 
which can result in the ossification of “winners” and “losers.”  To take a 
classic example, environmental protection groups want more stringent 
emission standards; polluters want more relaxed ones.  If the EPA 
regulates less stringently, the polluters “win,” and the environmental 
groups “lose.”  While each individual organ allocated by the Network 
similarly generates a “winner” (in the form of that organ’s recipient), the 
next-in-line “loser” is likely to become the next “winner.” Now, there is 
no perfectly “fair” way to allocate organs.  But, unlike limited-resource 
scenarios where static policies may ossify resource distribution,132 there 
 
 128  See Wisconsin v. Shalala, No. 00-C-155-C, 2000 WL 34234002, at *3 (W.D. Wis. 
Nov. 22, 2000) (emphasis added). 
 129  Cf. Policy Notices, OPTN, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/policy-notices/ 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2016) (“Find summaries of all OPTN policy and bylaws changes 
approved at board and executive committee meetings, including implementation dates and 
any actions you need to take.”); Policy Comment, OPTN, 
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/public-comment/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) 
(“The OPTN policy development process incorporates feedback on policy . . . before the 
proposals go to the OPTN board of directors for approval. Public comment is an essential part 
of the policy development process.  All interested individuals are welcome to participate, 
especially transplant candidates, who are most affected by policies.  The OPTN welcomes 
public comment on all open policy proposals.  We consider every comment we receive about 
a proposal before the OPTN board of directors votes on it.”). 
 130  If, to the contrary, the Network is subject to the APA, the Author posits that 
anonymously donated organs are “public property” exempt from requirements of notice-and-
comment rulemaking.  Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (“This section applies . . . except to the 
extent that there is involved . . . a matter relating to . . . public property . . . .”) with 63 Fed. 
Reg. at 16,300 (“Human organs that are given to save lives are a public resource . . . .”). 
 131  See generally Reeve T. Bull, Making the Administrative State “Safe for Democracy”: 
A Theoretical and Practical Analysis of Citizen Participation in Agency Decisionmaking, 65 
ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 627 (2013). 
 132  Cf. Craig A. Arnold, Resilient Cities and Adaptive Law, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 245, 257 
(2014) (“[L]egal protections of private property rights . . . undermine the resilience and 
functioning of ecosystems by . . . ossifying resource allocations . . . granted long ago.”). 
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is generally no concern about permanent unfairness in the allocation 
system,133 particularly since Network policy development is dynamic, 
cyclical, and ongoing.134 
Furthermore, by developing allocation policy blind to the identities 
of the individual candidates that may receive organ offers, the Network 
steers clear of any capture issue.135  Drawing on the same analogy, if the 
EPA is considering a carbon cap on industrial CO2 emissions, the EPA 
knows ex ante which players support and oppose the proposal and the 
impact the proposal would have on those players.136  But, allocation 
policy development is inherently devoid of capture in that they employ 
general rules that are applied algorithmically to candidates in real time.137  
In short, Network policymakers have no way of knowing how policy 
changes will affect particular candidates. 
So, while the Network is not subject to the APA’s notice-and-
comment requirements, its dynamic and blind policy development 
process is, as a general matter, transparent and procedurally fair.  
However, a crucial question so far remains unanswered: does the content 
of the Under 12 Rule fall within the range of acceptable choices 
delineated by NOTA and the Final Rule? 
B. Deference 
The Murnaghans’ answer was, no, that the Under 12 Rule was 
substantively “not in accordance with” NOTA or the Final Rule.138  Both 
the Murnaghans and the court oversimplified this allegation, and thereby 
failed to grapple with the subtle but important issue of whether the Under 
12 Rule reflects the Network’s interpretation of NOTA or its 
interpretation of the Final Rule.  (The court must have presumed that it 
 
 133  Yet, if a particular individual is constantly a “loser,” as the Murnaghans alleged Sarah 
was in the Under 12 Rule regime, then they may attempt to short-circuit the system through 
indirect means like judicial review.  See WEIMER, supra note 4, at 32. 
 134  See Making OPTN Policy, OPTN, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance 
/policies/making-optn-policy/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) (providing “a brief look at the 
process of an idea that transforms from proposal to transplant policy”). 
 135  Cf. Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1650 
(2008) (“Certainly, any private entity that makes use of the expertise of interested—and often 
self-interested—parties is subject to capture by those parties in a way that may distort its 
public mission.”). 
 136  See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 21 (2010) (“To achieve either expert or nonpartisan decision 
making, one must avoid undue industry influence, or ‘capture.’”). 
 137  See supra text accompanying notes 17–19. 
 138  See Complaint, supra note 20, ¶¶ 56–59. 
BRUGGEBREW.DOCX 8/30/2017  12:19 PM 
2017] QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL ORGAN ALLOCATION 25 
reflected the former because it found Chevron,139 but not Auer,140 
deference to be a less-than-weighty “factor” in its decision.141)  
Notwithstanding the court’s—likely unintentional—sidestepping of the 
question,142 whether the Network’s gap-filling is done pursuant to a 
statute versus a regulation matters. 
If an allocation policy is an interpretation of NOTA (as this Part 
argues is the case with respect to the Under 12 Rule), Chevron deference 
may be appropriate.143  But, if an allocation policy reflects an 
interpretation of the Final Rule, then it may be due Auer deference, a 
doctrine that three Justices have questioned categorically.144 
i. Auer and Skidmore 
Even if one assumes the continuing survival of the doctrine (which 
is considered even more deferential than Chevron 145), Auer deference is 
unavailable to Network policies because the Final Rule does no more than 
“parrot” NOTA.146  The Final Rule stipulates that allocation policies must 
 
 139  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984) (courts are to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes where the 
interpretation reasonably resolves the ambiguity). 
 140  Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (restating that an agency’s interpretation 
of its own regulations are “controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock 
& Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))). 
 141  See supra text accompanying note 57.  This Article sets aside the following question: 
was it appropriate for the court to consider Chevron deference as a “factor” in its TRO 
analysis? Cf. infra Part V (discussing the four factors relevant to a preliminary injunction 
inquiry, none of which relate to Chevron deference). 
 142  Like the court, one commentator assumed this to be an issue of statutory interpretation 
without further elaboration.  Cf. Michelle DeVito, The Judge Put Me on the List: Judicial 
Review and Organ Allocation Decisions, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 181, 196 (2014) (citation 
omitted). 
 143  See infra Part V.B.2. 
 144  See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“I would . . . abandon[] Auer and apply[] the [APA] as written. 
The agency is free to interpret its own regulations with or without notice and comment; but 
courts will decide—with no deference to the agency—whether that interpretation is correct.”); 
id. at 1225 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he entire line of precedent beginning 
with Seminole Rock raises serious constitutional questions and should be reconsidered in an 
appropriate case.”); see also id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“I await a case in which the validity of Seminole Rock may be explored through 
full briefing and argument.”). 
 145  Hanah M. Volokh, The Anti-Parroting Canon, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 290, 291–92 
(2011).  
 146  Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257 (“An agency does not acquire special authority to interpret 
its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, 
it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”).  Were parroting not an issue 
here, there would still be an issue of author identity: can Network policies receive Auer 
deference as interpreting the Department’s Final Rule?  Probably, yes.  See John F. Manning, 
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“result in the equitable allocation of cadaveric organs,”147 while “giv[ing] 
greatest consideration to allocating organs based on medical urgency.”148  
In other words, the latter consideration (“medical urgency”) is but one 
factor that the Network must incorporate into its overall “equitable” 
allocation scheme.  So, on reflection, the Final Rule’s insistence on 
“equitable allocation” and “medical urgency” simply parrots NOTA’s 
language, which requires allocation of organs “equitably among 
transplant patients.”149  And, this is not even the only example of 
parroting by the Department. 
Like NOTA, which requires the Network to “improv[e] procedures 
for organ . . . allocation . . . to . . . populations with limited access to 
transportation,”150 the Final Rule instructs the Network to “reduce 
inequities resulting from socioeconomic status.”151  At most, the 
Department’s focus on this “socioeconomic” class of candidates is simply 
a highlighting of one subcategory within—i.e., it neither adds to nor 
subtracts from—NOTA’s broader category of “populations with limited 
access to transportation.”  Since the Final Rule provides no further targets 
or goals for substantive Network policy development, the entirety of the 
Department’s substantive regulatory instructions appears to parrot 
NOTA.  And, when parroting, an agency’s interpretation of a statute is 
assessed with Skidmore deference, not Auer.152 
Under Skidmore, an interpretation is entitled to respect “proportional 
to its ‘power to persuade.’”153  While the application of the Under 12 Rule 
may seem normatively unfair out of context,154 there is no reason to 
suspect that the rule itself is unpersuasive: the lung allocation system is 
“highly detailed,”155 and the Network “benefit[ted]” from the 
“specialized experience” of the transplant community as it answered “the 
 
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 696 n.104 (1996) (“Authorship is not an essential predicate to 
deference under [Auer].  Rather, the Court has relied on the Chevron rationale to defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of regulations that the agency did not adopt.” (citing, e.g., BethEnergy, 
501 U.S. at 696–97 (finding judicial deference due to Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of 
regulations promulgated by Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, where congressional 
delegation “entails the authority to interpret HEW’s regulations and the discretion to 
promulgate interim regulations based on a reasonable interpretation thereof”))). 
 147  Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 58 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(a)(1)). 
 148  Id. ¶ 59 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 121.8(b)). 
 149  See 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(D). 
 150  See id. § 274(b)(2)(N). 
 151  See 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(a)(3). 
 152  See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 268–69. 
 153  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
 154  Cf. HHS Hearing, supra note 84. 
 155  Cf. supra text accompanying notes 29–32. 
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subtle questions” about pediatric lung transplantation.156  That said, a 
court should only rely on Skidmore if it has first determined that the 
policy reflected an interpretation of the Final Rule. 
ii. Chevron 
In the alternative, a court could find that the Under 12 Rule interprets 
NOTA, which would raise the question whether the policy is due Chevron 
deference.  The Murnaghan court assumed the applicability of 
Chevron,157 but failed to note, inter alia, that the defendant (the 
Department) was not, in fact, the author of the policy at issue.158 
a. Threshold 
If Chevron is going to be applied to a policy like the Under 12 Rule, 
a court should understand why that is so before deferring to a quasi-
governmental entity’s interpretation of its organic statute.  Here, the two 
norms that normally support a finding of Chevron deference—namely, 
expertise and political accountability159—intersect in such an unusual 
way that, perhaps, political accountability need not be demonstrated at 
all.160  Arguably, since the only interests implicated by allocation policies 
are those of the candidates, and since Network policies utilize “medical 
criteria” to allocate organs,161 political accountability ought to be 
irrelevant.162  Consider the following test: where organizational expertise 
 
 156  See supra text accompanying notes 75 & 99. 
 157  See supra text accompanying note 57. 
 158  It may be that this is a distinction without a difference, since courts may conclude that 
an agency has given its sub-agency a “stamp of approval” without “digging” deeply into 
“where an interpretation originated, or whether the agency was truly the primary interpreter 
involved.” Aaron R. Cooper, Sidestepping Chevron: Reframing Agency Deference for an Era 
of Private Governance, 99 GEO. L.J. 1431, 1450–51 (2011) (parenthetical omitted) (citing 
David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 
204, 234–35 (2001)). 
 159  O’Connell, supra note 63, at 923 (“[D]eference doctrines draw largely from the 
perceived institutional characteristics of agencies, notably their accountability and 
expertise—at least relative to the courts.”). 
 160  But cf. Kimberly N. Brown, “We the People,” Constitutional Accountability, and 
Outsourcing Government, 88 IND. L.J. 1347, 1391 (“Not all government contracts raise 
accountability issues of constitutional dimension. . . . [A] contract should be initially 
scrutinized for constitutional accountability if one of two triggers exist: First, a contract 
delegates to private parties executive power under the Constitution’s express terms, or, 
second, a contract affords to a private party the ability to exercise enforcement power in a 
manner that could lead to a realistic risk of interference with civil liberties.”). 
 161  See 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
 162  If, as the Murnaghan court presumed, HHS had directly developed the Under 12 Rule, 
then this analysis would be simpler: as a traditional cabinet department, Chevron’s 
accountability norm would certainly have been triggered, see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66 
(“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, . . .”) and 
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is extraordinary, where Congress justifiably entrusts rulemaking to that 
expertise, and where the interests implicated by the resulting policies are 
those of a narrowly defined population, political accountability need not 
be demonstrated because its value in the Chevron calculus approaches 
zero. 
Were it instead necessary to demonstrate political accountability in 
the context of allocation policies, there would be three potentially 
insurmountable obstacles to the application of Chevron deference.163  
First, the substantive secretarial oversight provision of the Final Rule is 
an invalid interpretation of NOTA,164 so, it cannot be relied upon to 
establish political accountability as a matter of law.  Second, since no 
Secretary has ever employed the procedural secretarial oversight 
provision (nor affirmatively approved an allocation policy), no Network 
policy has ever been generated in a politically accountable atmosphere as 
a matter of fact.165  Third, there is no statutory authority granting the 
President or the Secretary the power to remove any member of the OPTN/
UNOS Board.166 
 
satisfied since the Secretary serves at the pleasure of the President, subject to removal without 
cause.  Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. (PCAOB), 561 U.S. 477, 
483 (2010) (“Since 1789, the Constitution has been understood to empower the President to 
keep these officers accountable—by removing them from office, if necessary.” (citing Myers 
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926))). 
 163  Cf. Brown, supra note 160, at 1351 (“Inevitably, democratic accountability is 
compromised with the practice of government outsourcing, which occurs when the 
government contracts with private parties to provide goods or services for which the 
government is responsible.”). 
 164  See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 165  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 166  See PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 496 (“Neither the President, nor anyone directly responsible 
to him . . . has full control over the Board.  The President is stripped of the power our 
precedents have preserved, and his ability to execute the laws—by holding his subordinates 
accountable for their conduct—is impaired.”).  The PCAOB problem may be resolved by the 
possibility that the President could order termination of the OPTN/UNOS contract.  See 
Kimberly N. Brown, Government by Contract and the Structural Constitution, 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 491, 521 (2011).  But, if the President were to order termination, the order 
would first go through the Secretary, who would then have to command HRSA’s contracting 
officer (“CO”) to terminate the contract with UNOS.  And, that Administrator would be 
obliged to independently investigate before the contract could be terminated for the 
“convenience” of the Government. See 48 C.F.R. § 49.101(b) (2015) (“The contracting officer 
shall terminate contracts . . . only when it is in the Government’s interest.”); see also 
TigerSwan, Inc. v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 447, 452 (2014) (“Without question, a CO is 
granted a great deal of discretion in determining whether it is in the government’s best interest 
to terminate a contract for convenience.  However, while a CO is afforded wide discretion, 
[s]he is still responsible for making an independent decision with regard to a contract.” 
(citation omitted)).  Thus, even assuming contract termination makes the Network 
accountable for purposes of Chevron, see Brown, supra note 160, at 1403 (“To be sure, there 
are a number of hurdles that a constitutional accountability doctrine presents.  The precise 
details of what must be included in federal contracts to satisfy an accountability doctrine are 
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To summarize, if a court found itself unwilling to compromise with 
respect to the necessity of the political accountability norm, then, for the 
reasons discussed above, it likely would have to deny Chevron deference 
to the Network for three reasons: (1) the Secretary has no power over the 
substance of the Network’s policies; (2) even if she did, she has 
essentially waived it; and, (3) neither she nor the President can coerce the 
Network’s leadership for lack of direct removability.  What follows 
assumes that a court has concluded that the Network’s expertise is 
sufficient to outweigh the dearth of political accountability, and therefore 
that it is necessary to embark upon a Chevron analysis.167 
b. Step One 
In the case of the Under 12 Rule, the question at Chevron’s first step 
is whether NOTA is “unambiguous[]”168 in its use of the term “equitably” 
and the phrase “address the unique health care needs of children.”169  Or, 
more precisely, “employing traditional tools of statutory construction,”170 
has Congress “directly spoken to the precise question at issue:”171 
namely, how should pediatric candidates—or, at a lower level of 
generalization, how should pediatric lung candidates—be treated when 
compared with adult candidates in the context of adult-donor offers? 
To answer this question, one begins by looking at NOTA’s text. The 
Network’s allocation policies must not only “distribut[e] organs 
equitably among transplant patients,”172 but must also “address the 
unique health care needs of children.”173  Without further clarity 
elsewhere in the statute, NOTA is ambiguous as to how the Network 
 
not immediately apparent and would have to be developed through litigation or legislation, 
which takes time.”), it does not appear the President has direct control over the Network Board 
through termination and, therefore, the Network cannot avoid the PCAOB problem. 
 167  Some commentators have expressed categorical resistance to the idea of granting 
Chevron deference to a private entity.  See, e.g., A. Cooper, supra note 158, at 1460 (citation 
omitted) (“Structural aspects of privatization suggest that private delegation increases the 
likelihood that the decision-making values embodied in both Chevron and the Constitution 
will be undermined: values such as transparency, accountability, fairness, and deliberation 
may all be compromised.”).  Others would apply Chevron deference, at least in this instance. 
See, e.g., DeVito, supra note 142, at 197; Jocelyn Cooper, Dissecting the Heart of Organ 
Allocation Policy: Evaluating the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s Grant of Life in 
Murnaghan v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 59 VILL. L. REV. 269, 299 
(2014). 
 168  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 169  See supra text accompanying note 22. 
 170  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
 171  Id. at 842. 
 172  42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(D). 
 173  Id. § 274(b)(2)(M). 
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should treat children vis-à-vis adults.174  Assuming legislative history 
may not be considered,175 it seems the Under 12 Rule easily clears 
Chevron’s first step because it falls within the ambiguity gap established 
by NOTA—i.e., it demonstrably attempts to ensure “equitabl[e]” organ 
allocation while also “address[ing] the unique . . . needs” that attend to 
children who require lung transplants.  Before moving on to Chevron’s 
second step, however, a court must engage in the two-part Mead 
inquiry.176 
c. Mead 
The first prong of Mead asks whether Congress delegated authority 
to make rules “carrying the force of law,” holding that such a delegation 
“may be shown . . . by an agency’s power to engage in . . . notice-and-
comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable 
congressional intent.”177  So, here, the question is whether the Network’s 
internal notice-and-comment system is “comparable” to the APA notice-
and-comment system.178  NOTA’s text illustrates a striking similarity: 
 
 174  Here, ambiguity is readily apparent due to the potential conflict in allocating 
“equitably,” while still prioritizing children. In these sorts of circumstances, the Supreme 
Court “permit[s] the Executive to make trade-offs between competing policy goals.”  See 
American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. at 1251 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing, e.g., 
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 423–26 (1944) (approving authorization for 
agency to set prices of commodities at levels that “will effectuate the [sometimes conflicting] 
purposes of th[e] Act”) and Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 
607, 686–87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (“It is difficult to imagine a more 
obvious example of Congress simply avoiding a choice which was both fundamental for 
purposes of the statute and yet politically so divisive that the necessary decision or 
compromise was difficult, if not impossible, to hammer out in the legislative forge.”)). 
 175  Cf. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 406–07 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“One line of cases 
instructs us to cease our inquiry and give effect to the statute’s unambiguous language.  
Another tells us to wade into the legislative history in the hope of glimpsing ‘new light on 
congressional intent.’ . . . [O]ur decision about which path to travel implicates substantial 
theoretical questions of statutory interpretation, . . .” (citations omitted)), reh’g en banc 
granted, judgment vacated, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014).  If a 
court decides to consider legislative history at Step One, it ought to take note of two key facts.  
First, NOTA originally did not refer to the “unique health care needs of children;” and the 
bills, committee reports, and debates surrounding NOTA in the House and Senate fail to make 
reference to “child” or “children,” outside a general plea to increase the donor pool.  See, e.g., 
130 Cong. Rec. 29,982 (Oct. 4, 1984) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy) (“This bill is a small 
but very important step toward assisting children and adults dying tragically and unnecessarily 
because of the lack of needed organs.”).  Second, NOTA was amended by the Children’s 
Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, 114 Stat. 1101 (2000), to include § 274(b)(2)(M), 
which calls for the OPTN to be attentive to the “unique health care needs of children[.]”. 
 176  Cf. O’Connell, supra note 63, at 925 (“To the extent that boundary organizations use 
a wider range of tools to make decisions than the rulemaking and adjudication categories 
entrenched in the APA, they may have a harder time qualifying for deference under Mead.”). 
 177  533 U.S. at 227. 
 178  Compare supra note 129, with 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
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“[t]he [OPTN] shall . . . provide to members of the public an opportunity 
to comment with respect to [allocation] criteria.”179  It is difficult to 
imagine that a court would not find such language “comparable” to 
language directing an agency to utilize APA rulemaking procedures.  
Indeed, in an opinion handed down seven months before Mead (but 
seemingly prophetic of its holding), one federal district court found that, 
yes, the language of NOTA indicates the Network’s notice-and-comment 
system was meant to act in a manner “similar to” informal rulemaking 
under the APA.180 
What remains is to determine whether the Under 12 Rule, in 
particular, also satisfies Mead’s second prong, which asks whether the 
policy for which deference is sought was “promulgated in the exercise of 
[the Network’s notice-and-comment] authority.”181  It was: the Under 12 
Rule was made part of the lung allocation policy via the Network’s 
notice-and-comment system.182  Having now answered both Mead 
questions in the affirmative, it is appropriate to move on to Chevron’s 
second step. 
d. Step Two 
Here, courts uphold an interpretation of a statute if that interpretation 
is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”183  Since 
Chevron’s second step is dramatically more deferential than Skidmore, 
and since it is already evident that the Network’s allocation policies have 
the Skidmore-satisfying “power to persuade,”184 the Under 12 Rule would 
 
 179  42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(B). 
 180  See Wisconsin, 2000 WL 34234002, at *3.  
 181  See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.  One commentator has concluded that the Network’s 
allocation policies carry the “force of law” and are due Chevron deference, in part, because 
the notice-and-comment procedures described in the Department’s Final Rule (requiring 
allocation policies to be submitted to the Secretary and published in the Federal Register for 
comment) are “more suggestive of rulemaking procedures than the creation of non-binding 
policy statements.”  DeVito, supra note 142, at 197 (citing Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 
U.S. 576, 586–89 (2000)).  This argument, however, ignores a key fact: allocation policies 
have never been promulgated pursuant to the Final Rule; indeed, Sarah Murnaghan’s parents 
contended that this failure to abide by federal regulations was a reason to invalidate the Under 
12 Rule.  See supra text accompanying note 108. Moreover, were the Under 12 Rule examined 
through the procedural lens of the Final Rule (as the commentator seems to suggest it should 
be), then the Under 12 Rule necessarily would be invalid since it was not “promulgated in the 
exercise of [the Final Rule’s] authority.”  See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. 
 182  Roberts, supra note 20.  See generally supra note 129. 
 183  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron 
Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 599 (2009) (“Subsequent courts and commentators 
have treated Step Two as a requirement that the agency’s statutory interpretation be 
‘reasonable.’”). 
 184  See supra notes 153–156 and accompanying text. 
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undoubtedly clear Chevron’s second step.185  In short, assuming that the 
Network’s allocation policies generally may be subject to Chevron 
deference, the Under 12 Rule specifically would satisfy both steps of 
Chevron and, therefore, should be immune from judicial intervention as 
a matter of administrative law. 
C. State Action 
But, even Chevron deference cannot save a policy that is 
unconstitutional.186  In Murnaghan, Sarah’s parents claimed that the 
Under 12 Rule violated Sarah’s Due Process and Equal Protection 
rights.187  However, as a prerequisite to claiming that an allocation policy 
violates one’s constitutional rights, the plaintiff must also allege that the 
promulgation and/or application of the policy is state action.188  The 
Murnaghans avoided this issue altogether by suing the Department. But, 
the Department is not the entity responsible for allocation policies.189 
 
 185  See, e.g., Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. United States, 522 F.3d 937, 942 
(9th Cir. 2008) (where a quasi-governmental regulation survives the “less stringent Skidmore 
analysis,” there is no need to conduct Mead or Chevron Step Two analyses).  This Part does 
not analyze the substance of the Under 12 Rule to determine whether it would survive 
Chevron’s second step as this would involve extensive analysis of the Network’s scientific 
and medical judgments. Helpfully, one commentator has condensed many of the relevant 
considerations in support of her position that Chevron deference would be appropriate.  See 
DeVito, supra note 142, at 198–200. 
 186  Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 914 
(2001) (“Because the Constitution is a form of law superior to a mere statute, . . . there can be 
no doubt that Chevron deference must give way when the agency’s policy, although consistent 
with the statute and otherwise permissible in light of the statutory language and purpose, 
impinges upon principles that the Court has discerned in the Constitution.” (citing Dickerson 
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (“Congress may not legislatively supersede our 
decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.”))). 
 187  Complaint, supra note 20, ¶¶ 54–55.  Whether this argument would have been 
successful on the merits is beyond the scope of this Article. But, the intersection of allocation 
rules and the Constitution has received attention in the literature.  See, e.g., O’Brien, supra 
note 28, at 128–33 (analyzing the Network’s lung allocation policy in the context of equal 
protection and concluding that it “passes constitutional muster”); Benjamin Mintz, Analyzing 
the OPTN Under the State Action Doctrine—Can UNOS’s Organ Allocation Survive Strict 
Scrutiny?, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 339, 376–96 (noting a “racially discriminatory 
effect that results from the factoring of antigen matching in [kidney] allocation decisions,” 
and arguing that such an “allocation system may not be able to survive equal protection strict 
scrutiny analysis”). 
 188  Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) 
(“Our cases try to plot a line between state action subject to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny 
and private conduct (however exceptionable) that is not.” (citations omitted)); see U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.”); see also id. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 189  Query whether the Department was a proper defendant to this lawsuit in the first 
instance.  Cf. supra note 146 (discussing the author identity issue). Although the Network 
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So, the Murnaghan court should have addressed whether, when 
promulgating allocation policy, the Network—a quasi-governmental 
entity—is engaging in state action such that it is subject to claims of 
constitutional violations.  Critically, only a court may answer this 
question.  While Congress has discretion to impose statutory 
requirements on quasi-governmental entities—e.g., whether to subject 
them to FOIA190—Congress receives no deference in the determination 
 
immediately complied with the Murnaghan court’s TRO, it is arguable that it need not have 
done so, since the Network was not itself a named party in Sarah’s complaint.  See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 65(d)(2)(A).  It is more likely, though, that the Network was legally bound to obey the 
order as an “agent” or “servant” of the Department, see id. 65(d)(2)(B), since the Network is 
under contract with HRSA.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 190  The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) allows any individual to request federal 
agency records. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2014).  HHS, CMS, and HRSA are subject 
to FOIA and maintain offices to respond to requests. See Freedom of Information and Privacy 
Acts Division, HHS, http://www.hhs.gov/foia/contacts/index 
.html/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).  Private entities, on the other hand, are not generally subject 
to FOIA, Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 179–80 (1980), as they do not meet FOIA’s 
definition of “agencies.” Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1).  But, exceptions do exist.  See, e.g., Moye, 
O’Brien, O’Rourke, Hogan & Pickert v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 376 F.3d 1270, 1277 n.5 
(11th Cir. 2004) (concluding that Amtrak is subject to FOIA though not a federal agency 
(citing 49 U.S.C. § 24301(e) (2016) (“[FOIA] applies to Amtrak for any fiscal year in which 
Amtrak receives a Federal subsidy.”))).  A two-pronged test determines whether the subject 
of a FOIA request is an “agency record”: first, an agency must “‘either create or obtain’” the 
record; second, “the agency must be in control of the requested materials at the time the FOIA 
request is made.” Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1989) (citations 
omitted).  And, the “data generated by a privately controlled organization which has received 
grant funds from an agency, but which data has not at any time been obtained by the agency, 
are not ‘agency records’ accessible under the FOIA,” even when the agency subjects the 
private entity to “some supervision.”  Forsham, 445 U.S. at 173, 176–78 (parenthetical 
omitted) (finding that a private research group’s data were not agency records despite 
agency’s “right of access to the data” because the agency “ha[d] not exercised its right . . . to 
obtain permanent custody of the data”).  The OPTN/UNOS, as its moniker would suggest, 
has a dual nature: the OPTN is a shell quasi-governmental agency operated by UNOS, an 
entirely private non-profit entity that existed prior to—and wholly independent of—NOTA.  
See supra Part I. OPOs generate allocation lists in compliance with the policies of UNOS, 
which then stores and maintains those lists.  But, NOTA anticipates that the OPTN will 
continue to maintain the national organ-matching registry even if UNOS ceases to act as its 
operator.  See Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional 
Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 
62, 96 n.108 (1990) (“HHS . . . may select a different private delegate to discharge those 
functions currently undertaken by UNOS.”).  This in mind, the OPTN—and not UNOS—
must be the legal holder of allocation lists; otherwise, UNOS could (arguably) refuse to 
provide them to any successor-operator.  FOIA applies to the OPTN since it is a federal 
governmental agency, even if only a shell.  So, FOIA applies to the records produced by 
UNOS in its role as OPTN operator.  That said, neither UNOS nor the OPTN have a FOIA 
office.  So, as an experiment to determine whether UNOS records can actually be obtained, 
the Author submitted FOIA requests to HHS, HRSA, and CMS, for the lung allocation lists 
whence Sarah Murnaghan received her two bilateral lung transplants.  HHS immediately 
responded that it was not the holder of UNOS records, and forwarded the request to HRSA.  
See Letter from HHS FOIA Office to Author (Dec. 12, 2014) (on file with author).  CMS 
attempted to locate the lists and—upon realizing that it did not hold them—also forwarded 
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of whether such an entity is a state actor for constitutional purposes.191 
The following is an analysis of the Network under three of the 
Court’s tests for determining whether a nominally private entity is 
engaging in state action:192 entwinement, control, and public function.193  
 
the request to HRSA.  See Letter from Hugh Gilmore, Director, CMS FOIA Office, to Author 
(Feb. 23, 2015) (on file with author).  HRSA flatly denied the request.  See Letter from 
Thomas Flavin, Freedom of Information Officer, HRSA FOIA Office, to Author (March 23, 
2015) (on file with author) (“[T]he lung allocation lists . . . are exempt under FOIA Exemption 
(b)(6), which protects against the release of information about individuals in . . . medical 
files . . . when the disclosure of such information would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  It may be inferred from 
this response that HRSA perceives the Network’s allocation lists to be agency records subject 
to FOIA requests.  Otherwise, it seems more likely that HRSA would have responded as HHS 
and CMS did: by simply dodging the request, rather than citing to a substantive FOIA 
exemption.  Notwithstanding the implication, the Author appealed HRSA’s determination, 
arguing that Exemption (b)(6) does not apply to redacted copies of the allocation lists.  See 
Letter from Author to Deputy Chief FOIA Officer, Office of the HHS Assistant Secretary for 
Public Affairs (April 9, 2015) (on file with author).  HHS affirmed HRSA’s decision to deny 
disclosure arguing, first, that FOIA does not demand disclosure for lack of public interest; 
and, second, that the records themselves “are found in a Privacy Act System of Records 
(SORN-09-15-0055), Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN)/Scientific 
Registry of Transplant Recipients (STR) Data System,” access to which is limited by the 
Privacy Act.  See Letter from Catherine Teti, Deputy Agency Chief FOIA Officer, Office of 
the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, to Author (Aug. 19, 2015) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a 
and 74 Fed. Reg. 57,184, 57,184–86 (Nov. 4, 2009)).  In conclusion, HHS appears to view 
OPTN/UNOS allocation lists as “agency record[s],” at least for purposes of FOIA. Cf. Tax 
Analysts, 492 U.S. at 144–45. 
 191  See American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. at 1231 (“Congressional pronouncements, though 
instructive as to matters within Congress’ authority to address, are not dispositive of . . . status 
as a governmental entity for purposes of separation of powers analysis under the 
Constitution.” (citation omitted)); see also Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 296 (“[T]he 
character of a legal entity is determined neither by its expressly private characterization in 
statutory law, nor by the failure of the law to acknowledge the entity’s inseparability from 
recognized government officials or agencies.” (citing Lebron, 513 U.S. at 399 (“We hold that 
where, as here, the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of 
governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of 
the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the 
First Amendment.”))).  
 192  Cf. Gross, supra note 2, at 238–39 (“Although courts have not had to confront the state 
actor problem with respect to UNOS, it is academically interesting because it plays on an 
ambiguity that has persisted since NOTA’s enactment: how to characterize the mix of 
‘private’ and ‘governmental’ features constituting the OPTN.”). 
 193  This Part does not engage in four other state action tests for various reasons. See 
generally Julie K. Brown, Less is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 MO. L. 
REV. 561, 581 (2008) (citations omitted) (“The state action doctrine is slowly descending into 
utter confusion, where private parties remain unaware of what conduct subjects them to 
Constitutional restrictions, and courts are unclear as to the appropriate state action standard.”).  
First, the Court has not used the state compulsion test for over half a century.  Id. at 567 n.60 
(citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)).  Second, the joint 
participation test “applies in situations where the state so closely encourages a party’s activity 
that the private actor is said to be ‘cloaked with the authority of the state,’” id. at 567 (citation 
omitted), which is a situation utterly dissimilar from the relationship between the Department 
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The tests do not formalistically review the organic statutes of quasi-
governmental entities;194 rather, each is highly fact-specific and must be 
applied on a case-by-case basis.195 
i. Entwinement 
This fact-specific inquiry is particularly daunting when trying to 
predict whether a court would find state action under the entwinement 
test.  Generally, where there is a “pervasive entwinement of [government] 
officials in the structure of [a nominally private] association,” that 
“association’s regulatory activity may and should be treated as state 
action . . . .”196  In Brentwood Academy, the Court found state action 
where a state-wide not-for-profit interscholastic athletic association, 
which included most of the state’s public schools,197 acted through those 
schools’ representatives to regulate athletics “in lieu of the State Board 
of Education’s exercise of its own authority.”198 
Like in Brentwood Academy, where the voting membership of the 
association’s rulemaking and administrative arms consisted of 
representatives—e.g., principals—from the member schools,199 the 
OPTN/UNOS Board is primarily comprised of transplant surgeons 
representing the Network’s affiliated transplant centers.200  But, unlike 
 
and the Network.  Third, the symbiotic relationship test is “closely related to”—but “more 
unstructured than”—a fourth test, the nexus test, id., which has already received consideration 
in the literature as applied to the Network: while “[t]he facts underlying the OPTN scheme 
legitimate an argument of a sufficient nexus between the OPTN and the government,” it is 
extremely challenging to predict how the Supreme Court would categorize the relationship 
“because the determination of a sufficient nexus classifying a private entity as a state actor is 
heavily fact-driven.”  Mintz, supra note 187, at 373 (“[D]espite the presence of a relatively 
significant nexus,” the Court concluded that the United States Olympic Committee was not a 
state actor; hence “the Court is unlikely to find the OPTN a state actor on the nexus theory 
since the evidence of a nexus was stronger with respect to the USOC than it is with respect to 
the OPTN.” (citing S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542–
47 (1987))). 
 194  See Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 301 n.4 (“[I]f formalism were the sine qua non 
of state action, the doctrine would vanish owing to the ease and inevitability of its evasion, 
and for just that reason formalism has never been controlling.”). 
 195  Id. at 295–96 (“[N]o one fact can function as a necessary condition across the board 
for finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient, for there may be 
some countervailing reason against attributing activity to the government.”); Burton, 365 U.S. 
at 722 (“Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement 
of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.”). 
 196  Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 291. 
 197  Id. at 299–300 (“Only the 16% minority of private school memberships prevents this 
entwinement of the Association and the public school system from being total and their 
identities totally indistinguishable.”).  
 198  Id. at 291. 
 199  See id at 299–300.  
 200  See Board of Directors, OPTN, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/members/board-of-
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the committee members in Brentwood Academy, who were employees of 
the very state (Tennessee) that the Court found the association to be 
“entwine[d]” with,201 the members of the Network committees are 
citizens of various states and primarily employees of geographically 
diverse private hospitals, public hospitals, OPOs, and histocompatibility 
laboratories.202  Moreover, none of the voting members of its Board or 
committees are employees of the Federal Government. 
Also, in Brentwood Academy, the Tennessee State Board of 
Education had historically and expressly designated the association as 
“‘the organization to supervise and regulate [interscholastic] athletic 
activities . . . .’”203  Likewise, HHS has consistently designated UNOS to 
operate the OPTN.204  Finally, as in Brentwood Academy, where State 
Board of Education members were “assigned ex officio to serve as 
members of the [association’s rulemaking and administrative arms],”205 
the HHS Division of Transplantation is represented by ex officio 
members on the Network Board and on many Network committees.206 
Overall, it is an onerous—perhaps impossible—task to anticipate 
whether a court would find entwinement after weighing these various 
 
directors/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). 
 201  Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 300. 
 202  See Committees, OPTN, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/members/committees/ 
committee-q-a/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).  Worth noting, as an aside, is the Ethics 
Committee: its composition mirrors almost exactly the hypothetical “Medical Commission” 
Justice Scalia sketched in a prescient dissent.  Compare Ethics Committee, OPTN, 
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/members/committees/ethics-committee/ (last visited Nov. 7, 
2016) (listing the following as members (among others): six transplant centers M.D.’s; two 
OPO representatives; and three members of the general public, including Georgetown 
University medical ethicist Robert Veatch, Ph.D.) and Robert Veatch, Ph.D., KENNEDY 
INSTITUTE OF ETHICS, https://kennedyinstitute.georgetown 
.edu/people/robert-veatch/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) (“One of the pioneers of contemporary 
medical ethics, Dr. Veatch served as an ethics consultant in the early legal case of [a] woman 
whose parents won the right to forgo life-support . . . .”) with Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 422 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If rulemaking can be entirely unrelated to the exercise of judicial or 
executive powers, I foresee all manner of ‘expert’ bodies, insulated from the political process, 
to which Congress will delegate various portions of its lawmaking responsibility.  How 
tempting to create an expert Medical Commission (mostly M.D.’s, with perhaps a few Ph.D.’s 
in moral philosophy) to dispose of such thorny, ‘now-in’ political issues as the withholding 
of life-support systems . . . .”). 
 203  Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 292 (citation omitted). 
 204  See Wisconsin, 2000 WL 34234002, at *2. 
 205  Id. at 300. 
 206  See, e.g., Board of Directors, OPTN, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/members 
/board-of-directors/ (listing Melissa Greenwald (Director, HRSA Division of 
Transplantation) as ex officio member) (last visited Nov. 26, 2016); Data Advisory 
Committee, OPTN, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/members/committees/data-advisory-
committee/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2016) (listing its membership to include Monica Lin and 
Christopher J. McLaughlin (Division of Transplantation, HHS, Ex Officio-Non Voting)). 
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facts.  All considered, it is unclear which way the entwinement analysis 
cuts, whereas it is clear the Network is not under control of the 
Government. 
ii. Control 
Though decided in substantively distinct constitutional contexts, 
Livestock Marketing (First Amendment207) and American Railroads 
(separation of powers208) are leading examples of the factual and legal 
circumstances in which a court may find that the Federal Government 
controls a nominally private entity, thus opening the door to claims that 
the entity has violated the Constitution.209  While the quasi-governmental 
entities in those cases share some features with the Network,210 key 
distinctions evidence that the latter is not under the Government’s 
control.  In Livestock Marketing, the Court found that the Agriculture 
Secretary intimately and consistently “exercise[d]” authority over the 
Beef Committee’s ultimate advertising message, and therefore held that 
the “message of the promotional campaigns [was] effectively controlled 
 
 207  See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005). 
 208  See American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. at 1228. 
 209  Cf. Kevin R. Kosar, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30533, THE QUASI GOVERNMENT: 
HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS WITH BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR LEGAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 2 (2011) (organizing governmental and quasi-governmental entities on a 
linear spectrum based on “their relationship to the executive branch (and Congress)” as a 
matter of control).  Closest to the government are “highly ‘political’” quasi-official 
institutions that are “subject to pressures not dissimilar to th[ose] encountered by regular 
executive agencies.”  Id. at 6.  Farthest from the government are nonprofit organizations 
“honorific[ally]” chartered by Congress for “patriotic, charitable, historical, or educational 
purpose[s],” without conferral of governmental power or benefits.  Id. at 22–23; see, e.g., 
Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. at 542–43 (“The [United States Olympic Committee] is a 
‘private corporation established under Federal law.’” (citation omitted)). 
 210  For example, like in Livestock Marketing, where the “Beef Committee”—charged 
with developing generic beef advertisements, 7 U.S.C. § 2904(1), (4)(A)–(B) (2010)—was 
selected by a board of private geographically representative cattle producers and importers, 7 
C.F.R. § 1260.141 (2016), the Network’s Board and committees are also geographically 
representative and composed of private experts moonlighting as policymakers.  See supra text 
accompanying note 202.  Furthermore, both Amtrak and the Network have large-scale public-
benefit goals: Amtrak must “provide efficient and effective intercity passenger rail mobility,” 
49 U.S.C. § 24101(b), and reduce fares for the disabled and elderly, id. § 24307(a); the 
Network must distribute “organs equitably among transplant patients,” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 274(b)(2)(D), and “address the unique health care needs of children.” Id. § 274(b)(2)(M).  
And, both are recipients of significant federal financial support.  Compare American 
Railroads, 135 S. Ct. at 1232 (“In its first 43 years of operation, Amtrak has received more 
than $41 billion in federal subsidies.  In recent years these subsidies have exceeded $1 billion 
annually.” (citation omitted)) with Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committees, 
HRSA, at 14, http://www.hrsa.gov/about/budget/budgetjustification2015.pdf/ (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2016) (HRSA received more than $23M per annum in 2013 and 2014 for 
transplantation). 
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by the Federal Government itself.”211  Likewise, in American Railroads, 
the Court found the political branches “control[led] Amtrak’s . . . Board 
of Directors [and] exercise[d] substantial, statutorily mandated 
supervision over Amtrak’s priorities and operations,” and thus concluded 
that Amtrak was a “governmental entity for purposes of separation of 
powers analysis under the Constitution.”212 
The record here demonstrates the antithesis.  The HHS Secretary has 
never directed the Network to develop any particular policy (nor has she 
even adopted one promulgated by the Network213), and the Network 
Board’s members are private actors who have never been subjected to 
active Executive oversight (nor are those members subject to removal214).  
And, yet, as unlikely as it would be for a court to find on these facts that 
the Government controls the Network to the extent that it is subject to 
constitutional claims, there is one more state action test to consider. 
iii. Public Function 
In order for a private entity to engage in state action under the public 
function test, the “function performed [must have] been ‘traditionally the 
exclusive prerogative of the State.’”215  Two commentators have 
suggested that the Network does not perform a public function because 
“[t]he provision of general medical care is not a traditional public 
function,”216 and because “the private sector has traditionally been 
 
 211  Livestock Marketing, 544 U.S. at 560–61 (“[T]he record demonstrates that the 
Secretary exercises final approval authority over every word used in every promotional 
campaign.  All proposed promotional messages are reviewed by Department officials both for 
substance and for wording, and some proposals are rejected or rewritten by the Department.  
Nor is the Secretary’s role limited to final approval or rejection: Officials of the Department 
also attend and participate in the open meetings at which proposals are developed.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 212  American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. at 1231.  Notably, the Court held so despite express 
statutory language stating that Amtrak “is not a department, agency or instrumentality of the 
United States Government.” Id. at 1233 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 213  Cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 251 (1977) (“Had the State itself 
adopted the procedures it approved for the private utility, it would have been subject to the 
full constraints of the Constitution.”). 
 214  Contra American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. at 1231 (“[A]ll appointed Board members are 
removable by the President without cause.” (citation omitted)); Livestock Marketing, 544 U.S. 
at 560 (“All members of the [Beef] Committee are subject to removal by the Secretary.” 
(citation and emphasis omitted)). 
 215  Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)); contra, e.g., Olympic Committee, 
483 U.S. at 544–45 (“The [Amateur Sports] Act merely authorized the [Olympic Committee] 
to coordinate activities that always have been performed by private entities. Neither the 
conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports has been a traditional governmental 
function.”).  
 216  Mintz, supra note 187, at 367 (citing, e.g., Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 523 F.2d 75, 
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responsible for the procurement and transplantation of organs.”217  When 
considered at a low level of generality, their argument is well taken. 
But, at a slightly higher level of generality, the Network serves a 
different function: it operates to allocate a limited public resource.218  And 
this is a function traditionally reserved to the Government.219  So, when 
applying the public function test, the fact that the Network’s functions 
were previously managed by purely private organizations may be of less 
importance than the “stark fact . . . that there are not enough organs to go 
around.”220  Clearly though, a plaintiff-candidate’s success on a public 
function theory would depend heavily on the court’s tolerance of high-
level generality.221 
iv. Normative Judgment 
Regardless of the test employed, however, courts are granted 
considerable discretion to insert their own “normative judgment” when 
deciding state-action inquiries: “[e]ven facts that suffice to show public 
action (or, standing alone, would require such a finding) may be 
 
78 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that operation of a hospital was not a public function)). 
 217  Mintz, supra note 187, at 368; see Gross, supra note 2, at 238 (“One basis for finding 
state action—if the entity is engaged is an activity traditionally reserved for the state—has 
questionable applicability to the OPTN because transplantation, and hence organ allocation, 
is such a recent innovation.”). 
 218  Donated human organs are “a public resource and a public trust.” 63 Fed. Reg. at 
16,300; see Eric. F. Galen, Organ Transplantation at the Millennium: Regulatory Framework, 
Allocation Prerogatives, and Political Interests, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 335, 354 n.102 
(1999) (“The public trust doctrine, as applied to organs donated for transplant, suggests that 
donated organs are ‘preserved for public use’ and that the government, ‘as trustee for the 
people, bears responsibility of preserving and protecting the right of the public to the use’ of 
such organs.” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1991))); cf. Roy G. Spece, Jr., A 
Fundamental Constitutional Right of the Monied to “Buy Out of” Universal Health Care 
Program Restrictions Versus the Moral Claim of Everyone Else to Decent Health Care: An 
Unremitting Paradox of Health Care Reform?, 3 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 86 (2007) 
(“Rights to purchase . . . organs for transplantation . . . raise medical, scientific, and policy 
judgments about the allocation of scarce and uniquely important public resources.”). 
 219  See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but 
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 948–49 (1988) 
(“Legislatures are faced with significant choices in determining how to allocate limited 
resources in ensuring the[] protections [of life, health, and safety].  Such considerations led 
the [Constitutional] Convention to define the powers and obligations of Congress in general 
terms, so as to avoid confining congressional action unnecessarily.”  (citing The Federalist 
No. 44, at 284–85 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))). 
 220  See Strosberg & Gimbel, supra note 11, at 229–30. 
 221  Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 352 
(1992) (“If you assume that the purpose of [an] enterprise is to increase the number of 
protected interests, then ‘it is crucial to define the liberty at a high enough level to permit 
unconventional variants to claim protection.’  If you believe that tradition serves to restrict 
the powers of judges to pursue their vision of a good society, then you will choose a lower 
level of generality.” (citation omitted)). 
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outweighed in the name of some value at odds with finding public 
accountability in the circumstances.”222  Therefore, even if the Network’s 
policies qualify as state action under one or more of the above-
enumerated tests, a court may nevertheless conclude that the Network is 
immune from constitutional claims. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
That all said, just as courts presumably would not categorically 
dismiss claims that the Network violated NOTA or that the Final Rule is 
invalid, they likewise should not consider the Network categorically 
immune from claims that allocation policies are unconstitutional.223  But, 
contrary to Murnaghan, courts should not grant relief—regardless of the 
specific allegations at issue—without a more complete investigation.224  
Indeed, a considered application of the Winter factors demonstrates that 
the TRO in Murnaghan was improvidently granted.225 
To begin, the “balance of equities” tipped neither in Sarah’s favor, 
nor in favor of other candidates.  Sarah was not the only individual who 
could have been irreparably harmed by not receiving a lung transplant.  
All candidates suffer from the threat of irreparable harm.  As far as the 
court knew, the next candidate—who would have received Sarah’s first 
pair of lungs but for the suspension of the Under 12 Rule—could have 
died awaiting another offer.226  Since, the “balance of equities” were in 
equipoise in Sarah’s case, granting the TRO was inappropriate.227 
 
 222  See Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 295, 303. 
 223  Cf. J. Cooper, supra note 167, at 296 (“[T]he court’s decision [in Murnaghan] presents 
an opportunity for future transplant candidates to request judicial intervention when they are 
unable to receive an organ thereby increasing the scope and number of individual causes of 
action.” (citing Girl’s Need Breathes Life into Debate over Organ Allocation, NAT’L PUBLIC 
RADIO (June 6, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health 
/2013/06/10/189270798/Girls-Need-Breathes-Life-Into-Debate-Over-Organ-Allocation/ 
(“And then I can start to see other people saying, ‘You know what, I need a liver.  I need a 
heart.  Where’s a federal judge?’”))). 
 224  Contra DeVito, supra note 142, at 206 (“Judge Baylson was correct in issuing the 
TRO and suspending the OPTN policy for lung allocation to those under twelve as it applied 
to Sarah’s circumstances and in refraining from issuing a broad-based ruling about the OPTN 
under-12 rule in general.”).  
 225  See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff 
seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that 
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”). 
 226  Contra DeVito, supra note 142, at 206 (“A judge should be allowed to create a 
temporary solution . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 227  The Author recognizes that this situation was terribly fraught for the court: to deny the 
TRO would have been to close off the last and only avenue of relief to a dying child with a 
colorable claim of discrimination.  Yet, despite the deeply compelling nature of Sarah’s case, 
a likely dispositive order should not have issued until the court had fully considered the 
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Furthermore, consideration of the public interest should have 
prevented the order.  In grappling with this factor, the court should have 
asked, e.g., whether injunctive relief would harm the public’s interest in 
having a neutrally administered allocation system;228 or, whether an 
injunction would disrupt the public’s trust in the system’s fundamental 
fairness.229  The problem is that sudden abrogation of policy in individual 
circumstances could result in a perception that candidates with access to 
the media, or to politicians, or to the courts, receive preferential 
treatment—certainly not a result that is in the public interest. 
Of course, assuming a showing of a likelihood of success on the 
merits (as well as satisfaction of the other three Winter factors) in a case 
like Sarah’s,230 a court should grant prospective relief. But, any 
restraining order or injunction should be stayed, pending an appeal, to 
ensure thorough consideration.231  Ultimately, relief from the application 
of Network policy should be reserved for cases in which there is a 
substantial demonstration of a violated right, and should not be granted 
in expedited hearings that threaten to irreparably harm unrepresented 
candidates and traumatize the public’s perception of an equitable 
allocation system. 
 
confluence of policy decisions that resulted in her case being brought at all. 
 228  Cf. Ethics Memo, supra note 50 (“Politicians and judges who intervene in a complex 
allocation algorithm may be well-intentioned but fail to consider all the moral variables that 
must be balanced at the macro level rather than through an individual candidate’s 
experience.”). 
 229  Cf. Ladin & Hanto, supra note 31, at 599 (“Appeals waged through federal courts. . . 
reduce transparency and predictability, undermining the public perception of fairness, which 
could reduce donation rates.”).  By contrast, the Murnaghan court improperly conflated the 
public’s interest with Sarah’s.  Cf. Supplemental Mem., supra note 47, at 2 (“[T]he TRO was 
very much in the interest of the public as well as . . . Sarah. If, for example, the OPTN decides 
to suspend the [Under 12 Rule in the next few days], it would be a tragedy if Sarah were to 
die prior to the meeting from remaining ineligible for lungs that would have otherwise become 
available if she were treated as an adult.”). 
 230  Cf. supra Parts III–V (suggesting responses on the merits to Sarah’s regulatory, 
statutory, and constitutional claims). 
 231  At the request of the district court, the Court of Appeals could review this interlocutory 
decision on an accelerated timetable.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) (“When a district judge, 
in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of 
the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is 
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in 
such order.  The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action 
may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application 
is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application 
for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge 
or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.”); cf. Statistics, DONATE LIFE, 
http://donatelife.net/statistics/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2016) (an average of twenty-two people 
die every day awaiting a transplant). 
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